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The tenure laws have played an important role in the 
employment of teachers in the public schools of the Common¬ 
wealth of Massachusetts from the time of the enactment of 
the first tenure law in 1886 up to the present day. The 
history of those sections of the General Laws of Massa¬ 
chusetts which comprise the laws regarding tenure indicate 
clearly the growing importance of these laws throughout the 
decades. There is no question concerning the fact that present 
day teachers are more secure in their positions than were 
the teachers of the past. The trend of society in recent 
years has been to protect the positions of its civil servants 
and the teachers who belong to this group have fared better 
than some groups and not as well as some others. 
This problem is devoted to an attempt to determine to 
as thorough a degree as is possible the amount of protection 
which the laws pertaining to tenure offer to one employed 
as a teacher, supervisor, principal, and superintendent in 
the public schools of Massachusetts. 
One may well ask: ”What protection do the laws of 
Massachusetts give to me as a teacher in the public schools 
of the state In regard to the permanency of my position?” 
A question so general In nature may be answered most adequately 
3 
by breaking it down into a series of more specific questions 
and attempting to answer them in the light of legislative 
enactments, legal opinions, and court decisions involving 
cases which have arisen concerning the laws applying to 
tenure. Such a procedure is followed here. 
The chapters which make up this study have been written 
to answer the following questions: 
1. What does the word ”tenure” mean? 
2. What is the purpose of the tenure laws? 
3. What laws deal with tenure? 
4. Who are protected by the tenure laws? 
5. Under what conditions may a teacher serving on 
tenure be dismissed? 
6. Are such conditions always essential to the dis¬ 
missal of a teacher? 
7. What degree of power is invested in the school 
committee regarding tenure and dismissal of 
teachers? 
8. Is it possible for a teacher who has been dis¬ 
missed by a school committee to be reinstated? 
9. Is it possible for the laws relating to tenure 
of teachers to be rendered ineffective? 
10. What procedure should a teacher follow who is 
about to be dismissed? 
. To whom should a teacher present his grievance 
if he has been dismissed? 
11 
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12. Is it possible for a school committee to re¬ 
duce a teacher1s salary in an attempt to force 
his resignation? 
It is hoped that the answers to these questions will in¬ 
dicate the degree of protection which the laws applying to 
tenure offer to a teacher, supervisor, principal, and super¬ 
intendent serving in the employ of the public schools of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and thus provide an answer 





HISTORY OP THE TENURE LAWS 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OP THE TENURE LAWS 
An examination of the General Laws of the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts indicates that four sections of chapter 71, 
1 
namely sections 41, 42, 43, and 63, apply to the tenure of 
teachers, supervisors, principals and superintendents in the 
employ of the public schools of Massachusetts. 
In carrying out the purpose of this study to determine 
the degree of protection which these laws offer the above- 
mentioned group it will be necessary to examine these laws 
as they originally existed along with the changes which have 
brought them to their present form. This chapter is devoted 
to the history of these laws. 
Before going back Into this legislative history, it will 
be beneficial to possess a clear meaning of the word "tenure” 
and of Its purpose. 
Meaning of the Word "Tenure” — "Tenure” is defined as "the 
term of holding office." It Is a status to which teachers, 
supervisors, principals and superintendents attain upon ful¬ 
filling the conditions of the tenure statute. 
Purpose of Tenure — The purpose of a tenure statute has been 
declared to be the promotion of "good order and the welfare 
of the state and of the school system by preventing the re- 
Devlin, Joseph, Webster* s New Standard Dictionary, The 
World Syndicate Publishing Company, p. 936. 
7 
moval of capable and experienced teachers at the political 
2 
or personal whim of changing office holders,” 
Original Tenure Law — The first legislative enactment by 
the General Court of Massachusetts which applied to the 
tenure of teachers was Statute 1886, chapter 313 entitled 
"An Act Relating to the Tenure of Office of Teachers" and 
is stated as follows: "The school committee of any city or 
town may elect any duly qualified person to serve as a teacher 
in the public schools of such city or town during the 
pleasure or such committee provided, such person has served 
as a teacher in the public schools of such city or town for 
a period of not less than one year." 
Previous to the above enactment, an act was passed by 
the Massachusetts General Court in 1844 entitled "An Act 
Concerning the Powers of School Committee." This act did 
not specify the word "tenure" in its phraseology but did 
affect the employment of teachers because of the powers of 
dismissal of teachers which it gave the school committee. 
This statute said: "The school committee of any town is 
hereby authorized to dismiss from employment any teacher in 
such town, whenever the said committee may think proper, and 
from the time of such dismissal such teacher shall receive 
no further compensation rendered in that capacity." 
01Keefe, William J., "Teachers and Their Legal Rights", 
Educational Law Series Number 1, p. 45. 
2 
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mlttee shall suffer no decrease In salary with¬ 
out his consent, until at least one year after 
the school committee has voted to reduce his 
salary. 
Section 4. Nothing herein contained shall 
be construed as limiting the right of a school 
committee to suspend a teacher or superintendent 
for immoral conduct or other conduct unbecoming 
a teacher; and if the teacher or superintendent 
so suspended is subsequently dismissed because 
of such conduct, he shall not receive any salary 
for the period of his suspension. 
Section 5. Nothing herein contained shall 
be construed as limiting the right of a school 
committee to dismiss a teacher when an actual 
decrease in the number of pupils in the schools 
of the city or town renders such action ad¬ 
visable. 
Section 6. All acts and parts of acts in¬ 
consistent herewith are hereby repealed. 
Section 7. This act shall not apply to 
superintendents of superintendency unions. 
Section 8. This act shall not apply to the 
City of Boston. 
Changes in Law through 1914 — Important changes are noted in 
the 1914 act over those of 1844 and 1886. Primarily, Statute 
1914 compelled school committees to employ teachers at dis¬ 
cretion if these teachers were appointed again after having 
served for the three previous consecutive years in the same 
system. The 1914 act includes superintendents when mention¬ 
ing rights of tenure, whereas no mention was made of this 
group in the act of 1886. The latest act altered the condi¬ 
tions for dismissal of teachers and superintendents as laid 
down in the act of 1844 by requiring a two-thirds vote of 
the whole committee; a thirty days notice of intention of the 
10 
committee to vote on dismissal; a statement of reasons for 
proposed dismissal if the teacher or superintendent so re¬ 
quests; a recommendation, in the case of a teacher, from 
the superintendent to the committee as to the proposed dis¬ 
missal. 
It may also he noted here that section 3 of Statute 
1914 offered certain protection for teachers and superin¬ 
tendents from decreases in salary. Nothing of this nature 
can be found in any previous laws. Furthermore, superin¬ 
tendents of superintendency unions were specifically ex¬ 
cluded from the provisions of Statute 1914. Finally, the 
latter act excluded the City of Boston from its embrace. 
Statute 1918 — An act of 1918, chapter 257, section 182, 
amended section 7 of chapter 714 of the acts of 1914 by add¬ 
ing at the end thereof the words "or districts." 
Section Forty-one — In 1920 the above mentioned acts were 
combined into sections 41, 42, and 43 of chapter 71 through 
a consolidation and arrangement of the General Laws of 
Massachusetts. Section 41 remained unchanged from 1920 
through the Tercentenary Edition of the General Laws in 1932 
to the present time and is quoted here: "Every school com¬ 
mittee, except in Boston, in electing a teacher or superin¬ 
tendent, who has served in its public schools for the three 
previous consecutive school years, other than a union or 
district superintendent, shall employ him to serve at its 
discretion; but any school committee may elect a teacher who 
11 
has served In its schools for not less than one school year 
to serve at such discretion.” 
Section Forty-two — Section 42 was altered by Statute 1921, 
chapter 293 entitled "An Act Relative to the Dismissal of 
Public School Teachers and Superintendents." It said: 
"Section 42 of chapter 71 of the General Laws is hereby 
amended by inserting after the word proposed* In the tenth 
line the following: *. . . nor unless, if he so requests, 
he has been given a hearing before the school committee, at 
which he may be accompanied by a witness.1" This alteration 
is self-explanatory. 
With the above change, section 42 remained intact from 
1921 through the Tercentenary Edition of the General Laws 
(1932) and is here quoted: 
The school committee may dismiss any teacher, 
but in every town except Boston no teacher or 
superintendent, other than a union or district 
superintendent, shall be dismissed unless by a 
two-thirds vote of the whole committee. In 
every such town a teacher or superintendent em¬ 
ployed at discretion under the preceding section 
shall not be dismissed unless at least thirty 
days prior to the meeting, exclusive of customary 
vacation periods, at which the vote Is to be 
taken, he shall have been notified of such in¬ 
tended vote, nor unless. If he so requests, he 
shall have been given a statement by the com¬ 
mittee of the reasons for which his dismissal 
is proposed; nor unless, if he so requests, he 
has been given a hearing before the school com¬ 
mittee, at which he may be accompanied by a 
witness; nor unless, in the case of a teacher, 
the superintendent shall have given the com¬ 
mittee his recommendations thereon. Neither 
this nor the preceding section shall affect the 
right of the committee to suspend a teacher or 
superintendent for unbecoming conduct, or to 
12 
dismiss a teacher whenever an actual decrease 
in the number of pupils in the schools of the 
town renders such action advisable. No 
teacher or superintendent who has been law¬ 
fully dismissed shall receive compensation for 
services rendered thereafter, or for any period 
of the lawful suspension followed by dismissal. 
An Act of 1954 — An act of 1934, chapter 123, entitled "An 
Act Relative to the Dismissal of Public School Teachers and 
Superintendents" is worded as follows: 
Chapter 71 of the General Laws is hereby 
amended by striking out section 42 as appear¬ 
ing in the Tercentenary Edition thereof and 
inserting in place thereof the following: 
’The school committee may dismiss any teacher, 
but in every town except Boston no teacher 
or superintendent, other than a union or dis¬ 
trict superintendent, shall be dismissed unless 
by a two-thirds vote of the whole committee. 
In every such town a teacher or superintendent 
employed at discretion under the preceding 
section shall not be dismissed, except for in¬ 
efficiency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming a 
teacher or superintendent, insubordination or 
other good cause, nor unless at least thirty 
days, exclusive of customary vacation periods, 
prior to the meeting at which the vote is to 
be taken, he shall have been notified of such 
intended vote; nor unless, if he so requests, 
he shall have been furnished by the committee 
with a written charge or charges of the cause 
or causes for which his dismissal is proposed; 
nor unless, if he so requests, he has been 
given a hearing before the school committee 
which may be either public or private at the 
discretion of the school committee and at 
which he may be represented by counsel, present 
evidence and call witnesses to testify in his 
behalf and examine them; nor unless the charge 
or charges shall have been substentiated; nor 
unless, in the case of a teacher, the superin¬ 
tendent shall have given the committee his 
recommendations thereon. Neither this nor the 
preceding section shall affect the right of a 
committee to suspend a teacher or superintendent 
for unbecoming conduct, or to dismiss a teacher 
whenever an actual decrease in the number of 
15 
. pupils in the schools of the town renders 
such action advisable. No teacher who has 
been lawfully dismissed shall receive com¬ 
pensation for services rendered thereafter, 
or for any period of lawful suspension 
followed by dismissal. 
Effect of 1954 Revision of Section Forty-two — The revision 
of section 42 by the act of 1954 inserted into the law the 
exception as to dismissal for inefficiency, incapacity, con¬ 
duct unbecoming a teacher, or other good cause. It also 
added the provision applying upon substantiation of the 
charges, and changed to a certain extent the procedure relat¬ 
ing to the hearing. 
Formerly there was no requirement that the charges 
against a teacher be ”substantiated” in a proceeding before 
the school committee in the nature of a judicial investiga¬ 
tion. Prior to 1954 no judicial investigation was required 
as a prerequisite to removal. The committee in good faith 
could, by the requisite majority, dismiss a superintendent 
or teacher without legal cause.® 
Section Forty-two A — Section 42 was broadened again by an 
act of 1945, chapter 550, entitled ”An Act Giving Certain 
Rights to School Principals and Supervisors in Cases of De¬ 
motion.” It reads: 
Chapter seventy-one of the General Laws is 
hereby amended by inserting after section forty- 
two, as amended, the following section: f. . . 
See Graves vs. School Committee of Wellesley, 299 Mass. 
80. 
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Section 42A* No principal or supervisor who 
has served in that position for over three 
years shall, without his consent, be demoted 
for inefficiency, incapacity, unbecoming con¬ 
duct, insubordination or other good cause; 
nor unless, at least thirty days, exclusive of 
customary vacation periods, prior to the meet¬ 
ing at which the vote is to be taken, he shall 
have been notified of such intended vote; nor 
unless, if he so requests, he shall have been 
furnished by the committee with a written 
charge or charges of the cause or causes for 
which his demotion is proposed; nor unless, if 
he so requests, he has been given a hearing 
before the school committee, which may be 
either public or private at the discretion of 
the school committee, and at which he may be 
represented by counsel, present evidence and 
call witnesses to testify in his behalf and 
examine them; nor unless the superintendent 
shall have given the committee his recommen¬ 
dations thereon*f 
In short, section 42A gives the same degree of protection 
from demotion to principals and supervisors as section 42 
gives to teachers and superintendents from dismissal. 
House Bill 565 — At the present time there is a bill await¬ 
ing hearing before the Massachusetts General Court which, if 
passed, will further amend section 42. It is the 1946 House 
Bill number 365, entitled ”An Act to Give Preference to 
Teachers Serving on Tenure When It Is Necessary to Reduce the 
Number of Teachers in a School Department because of a De¬ 
crease in the Number of Pupils.” It reads: 
Section forty-two.of chapter seventy-one of 
the General Laws (Tercentenary Edition), as 
most recently amended by chapter one hundred 
and twenty-three of the acts of nineteen 
hundred and thirty-four, is hereby further 
amended by adding the following sentence at 
the end thereof; *• . .In case a decrease in 
the number of pupils in the schools of a town 
15 
renders advisable the dismissal of one or 
more of the teachers, a teacher who is 
serving at the discretion of a school com¬ 
mittee under the terms of section forty-one 
of this chapter shall not be dismissed if 
there is a teacher not serving at discretion 
whose position the teacher serving at dis¬ 
cretion is qualified to fill.1 
Section Forty-three — The rearrangement of the General Laws 
of Massachusetts in 1920 made section 3 of chapter 714 of 
the Acts of 1914 into section 43 of chapter 71. This 
section remained unchanged through the Tercentenary Edition 
of the General Lav/s (1932) to the present. Section 43 is 
quoted here: 
The salary of no teacher employed in any 
town except Boston to serve at discretion 
shall be reduced without his consent except 
by a general salary revision affecting 
equally all teachers of the same salary grade 
in the town. The salary of no superintendent 
so employed shall be reduced without his con¬ 
sent until at least one year after the com¬ 
mittee has so voted. 
Origin of Section Sixty-three — The history ^f the present 
section 63 must be treated separately from the sections whose 
history has been discussed above because its origin differs 
from that of the other laws with which we are concerned. 
The first mention in statutes concerning the employment 
of a union superintendent may be found in Statute 1870, 
chapter 183, sections 1 and 2, entitled "An Act Authorizing 
Towns to Unite in the Election of Superintendents." 
Section 1. Any two or more towns may, by 
a vote of each, form a district for the pur¬ 
pose of employing a superintendent of public 
. schools therein, who shall perform in each 
16 
town the duties prescribed by law. 
Section 2. Such superintendent shall be 
annually appointed by a joint committee com¬ 
posed of the chairman, the secretary of the 
school committees of each town in said 
district, who shall determine the relative 
amount of service to be performed by him in 
each town, fix his salary, and apportion 
the amount thereof to be paid by the several 
towns and certify the same to the treasurer 
of each town. Said joint committee shall, 
for the purposes named in this section, be 
held to be the agents of each town composing 
the district aforesaid. 
The above sections were incorporated in the Public 
Statutes of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1882 as 
sections 45, 44, and 45 of chapter 44. 
Statutes of 1888, 1893, and 1898 dealt with school 
unions but did not change the method of election nor the tern 
of office of a union superintendent, said term being for one 
year. 
The Revised Laws of January, 1902, incorporated the 
law concerning the employment of a superintendent of a 
school union in sections 42 and 44 of chapter 42. Section 
42 said: 
Such superintendent shall be annually 
appointed by a joint committee composed of 
the chairman and secretary of the school 
committee of each of the towns in said 
district, who shall determine the relative 
amount of service to be performed by him in 
each town, fix his salary, apportion the 
amount thereof to be paid by the several 
towns and certify the same to each town 
treasurer. 
Section 44 said: 
The school committee of such towns shall 
17 
be a joint committee, which for the purpose 
of such union, shall be the agents of each 
town therein. The joint committee shall 
anually, in April, meet at a day and place 
agreed upon by the chairmen of the committees 
of the several towns comprising the union, 
and shall organize by the choice of a chair¬ 
man and a secretary. They shall choose, by 
ballot, a superintendent of schools, deter¬ 
mine the relative amount of service to be 
performed by him in each town, fix his salary, 
apportion the amount thereof to be paid by 
the several towns and certify it to the 
town treasurer. 
Statute of 1911 -- The term of office of a superintendent 
remained one year until the passage of Statute 1911, chapter 
384, entitled "An Act Relative to the Tenure of Office for 
Superintendents of School Unions." This act amended section 
44 of chapter 42 of the Revised Laws by striking out from 
said section the words "choose by ballot" and by adding at 
the end of the section the words: 
Such superintendent of schools shall be 
employed for a term of three years, and his 
salary shall not be reduced during such term. 
Failure of a superintendent during his term 
of office to receive a certificate as pro¬ 
vided by chapter two hundred and fifteen of 
the year nineteen hundred and four, upon the 
expiration of a prior certificate, shall there¬ 
by vacate his office. He may be removed from 
office by a two-thirds vote of the full member¬ 
ship of the joint committee, and with the 
consent of the board of education to such dis¬ 
missal, whereupon his salary shall cease. 
The above amendment fixed a union superintendents term 
of office as three years, protected him from a reduction in 
salary, required his certification, and provided the machinery 
for his removal. 
Section 43 was amended by Statute 1911, chapter 399. 
18 
This amendment dealt with, the permanency of super intendency 
unions hut did not change the conditions concerning the 
employment of superintendents. 
Statute of 1912 — Statute 1912, chapter 114, entitled "An 
Act to Secure Equality of Representation of Towns on the 
• * i 
Joint Committee of a Superintendency Union" is stated in 
part here because of its importance in the organization of 
the group which employs a superintendent of a union and be¬ 
cause it forms part of section 63 of chapter 71 of the General 
Laws (Tercentenary Edition): 
Section forty-three of chapter forty-two of 
the Revised Laws, as amended by chapter three 
hundred and ninety-nine of the acts of the year 
nineteen hundred and eleven, is hereby further 
amended by striking out the word *which* in 
the twelfth line, and inserting in place there¬ 
of the words: ’ . . . provided, that any school 
committee consisting of more than three members 
shall be represented on the joint committee by 
its chairman and two members, chosen by said 
committee ... * 
An Act of 1945 — Parts of sections 42, 43, and 44 of the Re¬ 
vised Laws, as amended by the statutes of 1911 and 1912, 
were combined to form section 63 of chapter 71 by the arrange¬ 
ment and consolidation of the General Laws in 1920. Section 
63 remained unchanged through the Tercentenary Edition of 
1932 until amended by Statute 1945, chapter 223, sections 1 
and 2, entitled "An Act Giving to Certain Superintendents of 
Schools in Superintendency Unions the Tenure Benefits Granted 
to Other School Superintendents." 
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Section 1. Section sixty-three of chapter 
seventy-one of the General Laws, as appearing 
in the Tercentenary Edition, is hereby amended 
by adding at the end the following paragraph: 
f. . . A superintendent in a union who has 
served continuously in the same union for more 
than three years and who has been employed at 
least twice as superintendent in said union, 
each for a term of three years, shall not be 
removed except for inefficiency, incapacity, 
conduct unbecoming a superintendent, insubor¬ 
dination or other good cause, nor without full 
compliance with the provisions of section forty- 
two, relative to teachers and other superin¬ 
tendents, as to notice of intention to dismiss, 
specification of charges, hearing and sub¬ 
stantiation of charges.’ 
Section 2. Notwithstanding the provisions 
of section one of this act, a superintendent 
of a superintendency union in office on its 
effective date shall not be entitled to the 
benefits thereof except after he has been re¬ 
employed in said office. 
The above amendment places a union superintendent under 
the same rules for dismissal as any other superintendent and 
gives him the opportunity to serve at discretion after 
having been employed at least twice in a given union, each 
for a term of three years. 
Section Sixty-three — Section 63, as it now stands, is as 
follows: 
Section 1. The school committees of such 
towns ^""towns comprising union dlstricts_j7 
shall, for the purposes of the union, be a 
joint committee and shall be the agent of each 
participating town, provided that any school 
committee of more than three members shall be 
represented therein by its chairman and two 
of its members chosen by it. The joint com¬ 
mittee shall annually, in April, meet at a day 
and place agreed upon by the chairmen of the 
constituent committees, and shall organize by 
choosing a chairman and a secretary. It shall 
employ for a three-year term, a superintendent 
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of schools, determine the relative amount of 
service to be rendered by him in each town, 
fix his salary, which shall not be reduced 
during his term, apportion the payment there¬ 
of in accordance with section sixty-five among 
the several towns and certify the respective 
shares to the several town treasurers. He may 
be removed, with the consent of the department, 
by a two-thirds vote of the full membership of 
the joint committee. 
A superintendent in a union who has served 
continuously in the same union for more than 
three years and who has been employed at least 
twice as superintendent in said union, each 
for a term of three years, shall not be removed 
except for inefficiency, incapacity, conduct 
unbecoming a superintendent, insubordination 
or other good cause, nor without full compliance 
with the provisions of section forty-two, rela¬ 
tive to teachers and other superintendents, as 
to notice of intention to dismiss, specification 
of charges, hearing and substantiation of 
charges. 
Section 2. Notwithstanding the provisions 
of section one of this act, a superintendent 
of a superintendency union in office on its 
effective date shall not be entitled to the 
benefits thereof except after he has been re¬ 
employed in said office. 
This chapter ha3 treated the history of the laws apply¬ 
ing to tenure from the first legislation concerning them up 
to the present date, including the proposed legislation 
which consists at present of 1946 House Bill 365. Such a 
history will be of value to the reader in connection with the 
following chapters. 
CHAPTER III 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND OPINION OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON SECTION FORTY-ONE 
CHAPTER III 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND OPINION OP 
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON SECTION FORTY-ONE 
The Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts has handed down a considerable number of de¬ 
cisions on cases which have arisen from the three laws on 
tenure of teachers, namely sections 41, 42, and 43 of 
chapter 71 of the General Laws of Massachusetts, as well 
as several decisions on cases which have arisen from the 
law concerning the dismissal and tenure of superintendents 
of school unions which is section 63 of the same chapter. 
This phase of the study concerns itself with these decisions 
as an aid to the formation of a conclusion as to the extent 
to which the tenure laws offer protection to the public 
school teachers and superintendents in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. 
There are two opinions of attorney generals of the 
commonwealth which have been handed down on the tenure laws. 
These opinions, while not binding in a court of law, are 
of some value in indicating the reactions that these laws, 
or the cases concerning them, have on the legal minds who 
render decisions on our laws. 
It seems only logical In presenting the Supreme Court 
decisions and the opinions of the attorney generals on cases 
arising from these laws to group them according to the law 
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which provoked them. Some of the decisions tie in with 
more than one of the laws. Where this situation occurs, 
the case is repeated in the presentation. It is with this 
thought of sequence in mind that the information which 
follows begins with the decisions arising from questions 
on section 41 of chapter 71 of the General Laws and is 
followed by the decisions on sections 42, 43, and 63 of the 
same chapter. 
Section Forty-one — It seems wise at this point to quote 
section 41 of chapter 71 of the General Laws. This law 
says: 
Every school committee, except in Boston, 
in electing a teacher or superintendent, who 
has served in the public schools for the 
three previous consecutive school years, other 
than a union or district superintendent, shall 
employ him to serve at its discretion; but any 
school committee may elect a teacher who has 
served in its schools for not less than one 
school year to serve at such discretion. 
This law, like all others, has been put to many tests 
during its lifetime. Naturally, situations arise which are 
not covered by the law. These situations result in the de¬ 
cisions of the courts which are presented below. A glance 
at the above law makes one conscious of some of the more 
obvious questions which have arisen in connection with it. 
Following is a list of questions provoked by this law: 
1. What were the conditions of employment prior to 
the enactment of the law? 
2. How inclusive is the power of the school com¬ 
mittee under this law? 
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3. Does the law apply to teachers other than those on 
tenure? 
4. Must tenure be granted to a teacher who Is reappoint¬ 
ed after three consecutive years of service? 
5. What is the legal meaning of the word "discretion”? 
6. Does the law apply to part-time teachers? 
The answers to the above questions are presented below follow¬ 
ing the Supreme Court decisions on the cases that resulted 
from this law. 
School Committee could Discharge a Teacher at any Time — 
It was long the law that a school committee could discharge 
a teacher at any time. This was borne out In the decision 
In the case of Knowles vs. City of Boston.4 This case was an 
action of contract brought by Charlotte M. Knowles against 
the City of Boston in the Supreme Judicial Court, to recover 
salary as a teacher in a public school in Boston. 
Miss Knowles was for several years an assistant teacher 
In Boston, having been appointed annually and serving In that 
capacity until she was notified by the school committee that 
the school where she taught had been voted to be abolished 
and that her services were no longer required. She was dis¬ 
missed for no fault on her part. 
As the plaintiff had been appointed for the school year 
and had worked under said appointment for a few weeks before 
Knowles vs. City of Boston, 78 (12 Gray) Mass. 339. 4 
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being dismissed, she sued for salary for the first quarter 
of the school year. The defendants offered to be defaulted 
for a proportional part of the salary to the time of the 
plaintiff’s dismissal, and the parties submitted the case 
to the decision of the Superior Court who gave judgment for 
the plaintiff for the sum offered. The plaintiff appealed 
and the judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Gourt stated that the facts in the case 
showed that the mode of selection of teachers by the city 
was to make choice of them annually, and that they usually 
continued in employment in pursuance of such election for the 
ensuing year. But such an employment, in the absence of ex¬ 
press stipulation, must be deemed to have been entered into 
under the provisions of the statute, which gave the right to 
the school committee to terminate it at any time. 
Power of the School Committee Conferred in most General Terms 
In the case of Pulvino vs. Yarmouth, the Supreme Court 
elaborated on the power of the school committee. 
Joseph Pulvino was employed as Supervisor of Music in the 
superintendency union comprising the towns of Dennis, Yarmouth 
and Brewster. He was -under a single year’s contract begin- 
'■ ;r. • 
ning in the month of September, 1931 but was dismissed in 
v. 
I 
December of that year because the superintendent reported dis¬ 
satisfaction with his work. The case went before the Superior 
Court in which a verdict was returned in favor of the defen¬ 
dants. The plaintiff excepted and the Supreme Court upheld 
the decision of the Superior Court. 
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In upholding the decision of the Superior Court the 
Supreme Court said: 
It was suggested that the statute (Statute 1844, 
chapter 32) which states that the school com¬ 
mittee of any town may dismiss from employment any 
teacher whenever they may think proper, did not 
intend to authorize the school committees to dis¬ 
miss teachers unless some fault or neglect was 
committed by them in the performance of their 
• duties. But this Is altogether too narrow an in¬ 
terpretation of the above statute. The power of 
the school committee is conferred in the most 
general terms, and it is to be exercised whenever 
in the judgment of those to whom it is committed 
the public good for any cause requires it. Of 
this they are the exclusive judges.5 
Present Law Applies only to Teachers who are on Tenure — In 
the Pulvino case the court pointed out that the changes made 
by sections 41 and 42 in securing permanency of tenure and 
requiring certain procedure for a valid discharge relate only 
to teachers who are "on tenure”, and do not apply to one em¬ 
ployed for a single year.^ 
The Terms of Section Forty-one are Mandatory — This fact was 
brought out in the case of Paquette vs. City of Fall River.7 
Two teachers In the public schools of Fall River, 
Lillian J. Paquette and Alvin A. Gaffney brought separate 
actions against said city to recover a sum equivalent to the 
twenty percent reduction that was voted by the school com¬ 
mittee for all teachers serving on tenure In Fall River. 
* 
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Paquette vs. City of Fall River, 278 Mass. 172. 
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The cases went to the Superior Court where they were 
consolidated and a finding made for the defendant. The 
plaintiffs excepted and the case went to the Supreme Court 
which upheld the decision of the Superior Court and stated 
in part that nthe school committee has no option to elect 
the teachers there described” (in section 41) except ”to 
serve at its discretion,” The meaning of this statutory 
language is that such discretion includes every essential 
element in the service thus established save as otherwise 
specified by statute. In this connection the discretion of 
the school committee denotes freedom to act according to 
honest judgment. 
Implication of the Term ”Dlscretlon” — In the Paquette vs. 
Fall River case mentioned above the Supreme Court stated: 
The term discretion* implies the absence 
of a hard and fast rule. The establishment of 
a clearly defined rule of action would be the 
end of discretion, and yet- discretion should 
not be a word for arbitrary will or incon¬ 
siderate action. Discretion means a decision 
of what is just and proper in the circumstances.8 
The relation between teachers employed to 
serve at the school committee*s discretion and 
the city constitute a continuous and indetermi¬ 
nate service subject to the statutory provisions 
and the exercise of discretion by the school 
committee within the prescribed limits. They 
do not establish employment from year to year.9 
® Paquette vs. Fall River, 278 Mass. 172. 
9 
Paquette vs. Fall River, 278 Mass. 172 citing Corrigan vs. 
Fall River, 250 Mass. 330, 339. 
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Three Year Period of this Statute cannot be Lengthened by 
School Board — In a petition for a writ of mandamus, 
filed in the Supreme Judicial Court without a decision from 
the Superior Court, Marjorie J. Frye sought reinstatement 
to her position as a teacher in the public high school of 
Leicester.^ 
The issue depended on whether or not the petitioner 
had attained the status of tenure. The school committee 
claimed that because her last election took place on 
May 6, 1936, before the final expiration of her third con¬ 
secutive school year, she had not served "for the three pre¬ 
vious consecutive school years” as required by statute. 
In ordering the petitioner reinstated to her position, 
the court held that the clear purpose of section 41 is to 
provide some degree of protection for the tenure of teachers 
who have served a probationary term of three consecutive 
school years and who are continued in employment thereafter, 
and that doubtless its phraseology was influenced by the 
practice of electing teachers during the period intervening 
between the end of one school year and the beginning of the 
next. It could not have been intended that a school board 
could in substance lengthen the three year period of the 
statute into a four year period by holding its election of 
teachers on the last day of a school year instead of the day 
10 
Frye vs. School Committee of Leicester, 300 Mass. 537. 
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following. 
The Words “Has Served” and “Previous" do not Refer to the 
Precise Time of Holding the New Election — In the case of 
Prye vs. School Committee of Leicester mentioned above, the 
court pointed out that the words "has served” and "previous” 
refer to the time of the beginning of service under that 
election, and the dominant words of the mandate, "shall 
employ ... to serve at discretion." Therefore, a teacher 
must be deemed on tenure at discretion when he has actually 
served three consecutive school years, and has been elected 
for further service, even though the election takes place 
before the expiration of the last three consecutive school 
years.-*-1 
"Part Time Teachers" are not under Separate Classification — 
The Supreme Court further stated in the Prye case that 
section 41 recognizes no separate classification of "part 
time" teachers. The sole test mentioned is "service for 
three previous consecutive years. 
School Teachers who are not Employed at Discretion Serve 
only upon a Yearly Basis -- In an action of contract in¬ 
volving forty-one employees of the City of Woburn, the 
plaintiffs, some of whom were school teachers including 
Prank P. Callahan, sued the city for the balance of their 
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lawfully fixed salaries, unpaid because of insufficient 
appropriations. The Superior Court of Middlesex found in 
favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant, the City of 
Woburn, alleged exceptions and the Supreme Judicial Court 
sustained the exceptions in favor of the city. In its 
decision the Supreme Court stated that teachers who are not 
employed at discretion, although not covered by the pro¬ 
visions of sections 41, 42, and 43 of chapter 71 of the 
General Laws, are nevertheless under contract. ^ 
Making of Rules Determining Policy Weed not be by a Two- 
Thirds Vote — This opinion was an outcome of the decision 
of the Supreme Court in the case of Fernell B. Houghton vs. 
the City of Somerville in which the petitioner filed for a 
writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court, petitioning for re¬ 
instatement to her position as a teacher in the public schools 
of Somerville. The petitioner was dismissed after the school 
committee voted to bar married women from teaching in the 
school system. The petitioner contended that the school 
committee had gone beyond its constitutional power In making 
this rule. 
The Supreme Court In finding in favor of the respondent 
(the City of Somerville) said in part that there was no re¬ 
quirement in section 41 that the making of rules determining 
a question of policy shall be by a two-thirds vote, even 
13 
Callahan vs. Woburn, 306 Mass. 265. 
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though the operation of such rules may almost inevitably 
result in some dismissals 
Rule Dismissing Married Teachers is Constitutional — In 
the decision of the Houghton case stated above the Supreme 
Court held that a rule adopted by the school committee 
giving them the power to dismiss married school teachers was 
not unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contract 
because the employment under this section is at "discretion” 
and always subject to the policy making powers of the com¬ 
mittee.^ 
Dismissal of a Teacher or Superintendent must be in Con¬ 
formity with Section Forty-two — In the case of Graves vs. 
the School Committee of Wellesley, in which S. Monroe Graves 
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus rein¬ 
stating him to his former position as Superintendent of Schools 
In Wellesley, the Supreme Court stated in ordering his re¬ 
instatement that a superintendent holding his position under 
the provisions of section forty-one of chapter 71 Is not 
subject to dismissal except in conformity to section forty- 
two of the same chapter.^ 
A Vote to Promote a Teacher on Tenure can be Revoked before 
Effective Date — In the case at hand, McDevitt vs. Malden, 





Graves vs. School Committee of Wellesley, 299 Mass. 80 
(discussed more fully under section 42). 
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John W. McDevitt petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ 
of mandamus ordering the school committee of that city to 
reinstate him to the position of principal of a combined 
junior high school and elementary school at a salary higher 
than he had been getting, a position to which he had been 
\ 
elected by the school committee on December 17, 1935. 
On January 6, 1936, after a city election had brought 
about a change in the personnel of the school board, the new 
board voted that tt he Superintendent be instructed not to 
recognize” the vote of December 17, ”inasmuch as it did not 
conform with section 59 of chapter 71 of the General Laws of 
Massachusetts and that the position be declared vacant.” 
That section provides that superintendents of schools ’’shall 
recommend to the committee teachers, textbooks, and courses 
of study.” 
The court, in ruling against the petitioner, stated that 
the general managerial powers of the school committee con¬ 
tinued to exist after December 17, 1935. Those powers in¬ 
cluded the power to change by a majority vote the duties of 
teachers on tenure at discretion. The court also stated 
that the fact that a majority of the committee was mistaken 
that the vote of December 17 was invalid because it had not 
recommended the petitioner, that reason was not the dominating 
reason for the vote of January 6, and that the petitioner was 
not entitled to the increase in salary as it was not the in¬ 
tention of section 43 to protect a salary the right to which 
33 
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never became vested. 
Terms of Sections Forty-one and Forty-two may be Rendered 
Ineffective — Following Is an opinion of an attorney 
general concerning the effect which a change in the city 
charter would have upon the tenure of office of teachers in 
the City of Pittsfield: 
Statute 1932, Chapter 280, section 37, deal¬ 
ing with a revision in the city charter, says as 
far as is applicable: *Said committee shall 
appoint annually, but not of their own number, 
a superintendent of schools and such other sub¬ 
ordinate officers, teachers and assistants, 
including janitors of school buildings, as it 
may seem necessary for the proper discharge of 
its duties . . . .f 
Said statute of 1932, chapter 280, section 37 
provides in effect that teachers shall be appoint¬ 
ed only for terms not in excess of one year. 
This provision is entirely inconsistent with the 
terms of General Law, chapter 71, relative to 
the election of teachers * to serve at its 
/’"’the school committee * s_J/ discretion*, as the 
quoted words are used in chapter 71, sections 
41 and 42. As used in said sections 41 and 
42 the phrases * serve at its discretion*, 
*to serve at discretion* and * employed at dis¬ 
cretion* connote employment not for a period 
with a fixed and definite maximum length, but 
for an indefinite period. Hence the provisions 
of said General Law, chapter 71, sections 41 
and 42, with relation to the tenure of teachers 
who are chosen to serve at discretion, have no 
application to teachers who are appointed 
annually, as those functioning under the newly 
adopted charter of Pittsfield are to be. In 
other words, the terms of said section 41 and 
at least the second sentence of section 42, 
are rendered ineffective as to the teachers of 
Pittsfield by the passage and adoption of said 
Statute 1932, chapter 280, when it becomes fully 
effective as described in its section 46. 
17 
McDevitt vs. School Committee of Malden, 298 Mass. 213 
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Teachers have no vested interest in the 
tenure of their offices that the same may not 
be altered or destroyed by an act of the Legis¬ 
lature, so that teachers elected prior to the 
passage of said chapter 280 will be in no 
different case than others after the act be¬ 
comes effective in this respect.^-8 
The citizens of Pittsfield hearkened to the opinion of 
the attorney general in this instance as the act was not pre¬ 
sented on the ballot for ratification at the city election 
until it had been amended by the legislative act of 1933, 
chapter 231, section 4, which concerns itself with the em¬ 
ployment of teachers and is quoted herewith: 
Section thirty-seven of chapter two hundred 
and eighty of the acts of 1932 is hereby amended 
by striking out the third paragraph and insert¬ 
ing in place thereof the following: • • . Said 
committee shall annually elect one of its number 
as chairman to serve in the absence of the 
mayor, shall annually appoint one of its number 
to attend the meetings of the city council and 
shall annually appoint one of its number as 
secretary, who shall be under its direction and 
control. Said committee shall elect teachers 
and a superintendent of schools annually, ex¬ 
cept as provided by section forty-one of the 
General Laws, and may dismiss or suspend such 
teachers and superintendent, subject to sections 
forty-two of said chapter seventy-one.19 
Chapter 280 of the acts of 1932 as amended by chapter 231 
of the acts of 1933 was ratified at the next city election 
.p" 
at Pittsfield. 
^ Opinion of the Attorney General (1933), 28. 
19 
Mass. Statutes, 1933. 
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Answers to Questions on Section Forty-one. 
!• What were the conditions of employment prior to 
the enactment of the law? — Prior to the enact¬ 
ment of the tenure law, a school committee could 
discharge a teacher at any time. 
2. How inclusive is the power of the school committee 
under this law? — The power of the school com¬ 
mittee under this law is broad and ample and con¬ 
strued in the most general terms. 
3..Does the law apply to teachers other than those on 
tenure? — Section 41 applies only to teachers who 
are on tenure and not to one employed for a single 
year. 
4. Must tenure be granted to a teacher who is reappointed 
after three consecutive years of service? — Yes. 
The three year period of this statute cannot be 
lengthened by the school board. 
5. What is the legal meaning of the term "discretion"? — 
Discretion means a decision of what is just and proper 
in the circumstances. 
6. Does the law apply to "part time" teachers? — 
Section 41 recognizes no separate classification of 
"part time" teachers. The sole test mentioned is 
"service for three previous consecutive school years." 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON SECTION FORTY-TWO 
CHAPTER IV 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON SECTION FORTY-TWO 
The same plan will be followed In the presentation of 
the Supreme Court decisions applying to section 42 as was 
followed with section 41. 
Section Forty-two — The Important points of section 42 are 
as follows: 
The school committee may dismiss any teacher, 
but in every town except Boston no teacher . . . 
shall be dismissed unless by a two-thirds vote 
of the whole committee. ... a teacher or super¬ 
intendent employed at discretion • . . shall not 
be dismissed except for inefficiency. Incapacity, 
conduct unbecoming a teacher or superintendent 
• • . nor unless at least thirty days, . . . 
prior to meeting at which vote is to be taken, 
he shall have been notified of such intended 
vote; nor unless, ... he shall have been fur¬ 
nished ... with a written charge or charges 
of the cause or causes for which his dismissal 
is proposed; nor unless, ... he has been given 
a hearing before the school committee . . . and 
at which he may be represented by counsel, present 
evidence and call witnesses to testify in his 
behalf and examine them; nor unless the charge 
or charges have been substantiated; nor unless. 
In the case of a teacher, the superintendent 
shall have given the committee his recommendations 
thereon. Neither this nor the preceding section 
shall affect the right of a committee to suspend 
a teacher or superintendent for unbecoming con¬ 
duct, or to dismiss a teacher whenever an actual 
decrease In the number of pupils • • • renders 
such action advisable. No teacher or superin¬ 
tendent who has been lawfully dismissed shall 
receive compensation for services rendered there¬ 
after, or for any period of lawful suspension 
followed by dismissal. 
The Items of Importance in section 42A, the most recent 
amendment to section 42, are: 
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No principal or supervisor who has served 
in that position for over three years shall 
... he demoted for inefficiency . . .; nor 
unless, at least thirty days . . . prior to 
the meeting at which the vote is to be taken, 
he shall have been notified of such intended 
vote; nor unless, ... he shall have been 
furnished by the committee with a written 
charge or charges of the cause or causes for 
which his demotion is proposed; nor unless, 
... he has been given a public hearing be¬ 
fore the school committee, ... at which he 
may be represented by counsel, present evi¬ 
dence and call witnesses to testify in his 
behalf and examine them; nor unless the charge 
or charges have been substantiated; nor unless 
the superintendent shall have given the com¬ 
mittee his recommendations thereon. 
It may be seen from inspection that section 42A is 
phrased similar to section 42 in order to give the same pro¬ 
tection to principals and supervisors as is given to teachers 
and superintendents. This amendment is of such recent en¬ 
actment that no cases have been brought to the Supreme Court 
for decisions concerning it. The following decisions and 
interpretations must of necessity be confined to section 42. 
It must be borne in mind, however, that some of the decisions 
following would be considerably different if section 42A had 
been in effect. It is also true that many of the decisions 
are based upon the law as it existed in the past. 
A study of section 42 brings out a considerable number 
of questions which naturally arise in connection with this 
statute, some of which are: 
1. Must the school committee elaborate on specifica¬ 
tions for dismissal? 
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2. Is the statutory power of a school committee 
strictly or freely construed? 
3. V^hat is the meaning of the terra "judicial inves¬ 
tigation” as it applies here? 
4. What is the meaning of the word "substantiated" as 
it applies here? 
5. What teachers are covered by this section? 
6. Does a vote of dismissal indicate that the charges 
have been substantiated? 
7. Must the school committee always act in the interest 
of the schools? 
8. Is the committee empowered to change duties of a 
teacher on tenure? 
9, May counsel appear for the committee? 
10. Must recommendation of superintendent favor dis¬ 
missal? 
11. What constitutes "good cause"? 
12. Must a board member who Is prejudiced withdraw from 
board during vote on dismissal? 
13. Does the section afford any protection to a teacher 
on tenure over one notion tenure if a dismissal is 
required because of a decrease in enrolment? 
The answers to the above questions are found following 
the Supreme Court decisions which are presented below. 
Provisions of Section Forty-two Indicate Purpose of General 
Court to Cover Field of Relations between Teachers and 
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Committees — The Supreme Court ruled In the case of 
Paquette vs. Fall River that the provisions of sections 42 
and 43 of chapter 71 indicate the purpose of the General 
Court to cover the field of relations between teachers and 
school committees and not leave operative general rules 
arising from implications which would govern the rights be¬ 
tween independent parties.^0 
Charges must be Substantiated — In an action of tort, pre¬ 
viously before the Supreme Court in 286 Mass. 440, Elizabeth 
S. Caverno brought suit against the defendant Fellows, 
Superintendent of Schools of the City of Gloucester, the de¬ 
fendant Johnson, principal of the high school of said city, 
and the defendant Harris, Supervisor of English in said high 
school, alleging malicious interference with the plaintiff1s 
contract of employment as a teacher in said high school and 
maliciously procuring her dismissal as such teacher by the 
school committee of said city. 
In the case previously before the Supreme Court, the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendants ’’unlawfully and with¬ 
out justifiable cause did conspire to have said plaintiff 
dismissed from her position as a school teacher . . . 
The defendants demurred to the declarations on the grounds 
that no particular charge was specified. The Supreme Court 
sustained the demurrer because there was no tort set out as 
20 Paquette vs. Fall River, 278 Mass. 172 citing Lowell 
vs. Lowell, 265 Mass. 353. 
41 
to a single defendant. 
Thereafter the declaration was amended to read "for 
malicious interference . . ."as stated above. The case 
went before a single justice of the Supreme Court who 
ruled in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged 
exceptions and the case went to the full court. The full 
court in overruling the exceptions stated that there was no 
evidence that the conduct of any of the defendants was 
actuated by ill will toward, or a purpose to harm, the 
plaintiff, rather than by a justifiable purpose to perform 
their respective duties; and that prior to 1934 there was 
no requirement that the charges against a teacher be "sub¬ 
stantiated" in a proceeding before the school committee in 
the nature of a judicial investigation.^ 
Judicial Investigation a Prerequisite to Removal — In a 
petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the school com¬ 
mittee of Wellesley to reinstate him into the office of 
Superintendent of Schools (Graves vs. Wellesley), S. Monroe 
Graves claimed that the school committee offered no evidence 
to substantiate the charges which included: "Your failure 
and apparent Inability to create and maintain the school 
system as one continuous and consistent whole . . . ." 
The Supreme Court, in sustaining the petition, stated 
21 Caverno vs. Fellows, 300 Mass. 331. 
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that before chapter 123 of the acts of 1934 was passed, no 
Judicial investigation was required as a prerequisite to 
removal. The committee in good faith could, by the re¬ 
quisite majority, dismiss a superintendent of schools or a 
teacher without any legal cause. However, as the petitioner 
was given a hearing at which no evidence was introduced in 
support of the charges against him, mandamus will lie to 
enforce compliance with General Law chapter 71, section 42, 
as amended by Statute 1934, chapter 123, which requires sub¬ 
stantiation of charges and judicial investigation as pre¬ 
requisites to dismissal.^ 
Section Forty-two must be Compiled with — Teachers on 
tenure at discretion cannot be dismissed from the teaching 
force without compliance with this section. This fact was 
emphasized in the case of McDevitt vs. School Committee of 
Malden which was mentioned previously with section 41.^® 
Notification of Appointment of a Successor is not a Com¬ 
pliance — It was brought out in the case of Graves vs. 
Wellesley, mentioned above, that a dismissal of a superin¬ 
tendent of schools employed by a town at discretion was not 
in conformity with section 42 as amended by Statute 1934, 
chapter 123, where the committee notified him that they had 
Graves vs. School Committee of Wellesley, 299 Mass. 80. 
23 
McDevitt vs. School Committee of Malden, 298 Mass. 213. 
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chosen his successor before even intimating to him that 
they proposed to dismiss him. Manifestly such action was 
not in accordance with judicial investigation.24 
School Committee not Required to Elaborate on Specifications 
for Dismissal — A petition by Alice T. Corrigan (Corrigan 
vs. New Bedford), the principal of a public school in New 
Bedford for a writ of mandamus to compel the school com¬ 
mittee to furnish her full and complete specifications of the 
reasons assigned by them for their contemplated action in 
proceeding to vote upon her dismissal provoked the following 
decision from the Supreme Court, after the petitioner took 
exception to the decision of a single member who had dis¬ 
missed the petition.: "Information given the principal of a 
public school at her request by the school committee stating 
that 'the committee's dissatisfaction with her work and the 
belief that she has not demonstrated constructive leadership 
and necessary administrative capability' was sufficient com¬ 
pliance with section 42 of chapter 71, as to statement of 
reasons, and the school committee cannot be required to give 
further specifications in response to the request.” On this 
ground the exception of the petitioner was overruled.2^ 
The Statutory Power of a School Committee to Discharge Teachers 
^ Graves vs. School Committee of Wellesley, 299 Mass. 80. 
25 
Corrigan vs. School Committee of New Bedford, 250 Mass. 
334. 
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has always been Freely Construed -- This interpretation of 
section 42 was brought out in the case of Davis vs. School 
Committee of Somerville which resulted from a petition to 
the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus by Hazel M. Davis 
to restore her to active service as a teacher in the public 
schools in the City of Somerville. 
The petitioner, employed on tenure in Somerville prior 
to her unrequested retirement by the school committee, 
claimed failure on the part of the school committee to notify 
the retirement board within five days after her dismissal 
with a fair summary of the facts relating to her removal and 
that her removal consequently became null and void. 
The Supreme Court said, in dismissing the petition, 
that one of the most important duties involved in the manage¬ 
ment of a school system is the choosing and keeping of proper 
and competent teachers. The success of a school system de¬ 
pends largely on the character and ability of the teachers. 
Unless a school committee has authority to employ and dis¬ 
charge teachers it would be difficult to perform properly its 
duty of managing a school system. The statutory powers of 
the school committee to discharge teachers has always been 
freely construed. 
Interpretation of Term wJudicial Investigation” and Word 
"Substantiated” as They Apply to Section Forty-two — It was 
26 




brought out In the now familiar case of Graves vs. School 
Committee of Wellesley that a hearing under General Law 
(Tercentenary Edition) chapter 71, section 42, as amended 
by Statute 1934, chapter 123 is in the nature of a judicial 
investigation after preferment of charges and notice, and 
the establishment of sufficient cause for dismissal by ade¬ 
quate evidence. It was also stated that the word ”sub¬ 
stantiated” has been defined to mean ”to establish the ex- 
27 
istence or truth of, by true or competent evidence." 
This Statute in Substance and Effect Requires a Hearing upon 
Evidence — In Graves vs. School Committee of Wellesley the 
Supreme Court in sustaining the petition pointed out that 
disbelief of testimony of witnesses called by a superintendent 
In his behalf Is not the equivalent of evidence in support 
of the charges produced by the committee, and that nothing 
can be treated as evidence which Is not introduced as such. 
It further stated that the respondents (committee) called no 
witnesses and offered no evidence and the petitioner did call 
witnesses who were wholly favorable to the petitioner and 
that disbelief of testimony of witnesses on the part of members 
of the school committee Is not the same as evidence against 
the petitioner.^ 




Similarly, in Moran vs. School Committee of Little¬ 
ton which is discussed in detail further along in this 
chapter, the Supreme Court brought out that a decision made 
• *■ 
by an administrative board after a hearing required in a 
quasi-judicial proceeding is a nullity if based on evidence 
known only to members of the board and not presented at the 
hearing.^ 
Dismissal is not merely a Change In Assignment of Duties — 
In Boody vs. School Committee of Barnstable, Louis M. Boody 
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to re¬ 
store him to the position of supervising principal of the 
high and junior high schools. 
Mr. Boody had served on tenure in the town of Barn¬ 
stable as a teacher and a principal for many years. In 1929 
the school committee of three members elected the petitioner 
as a supervising principal of the high and junior high 
schools. He performed these duties until the spring of 1930 
when the committee was increased In membership to five 
members and In September 1930 the enlarged committee voted 
to change Mr. Boody* s duties to those of a teacher in the high 
school. No change In salary was made and no notice of the 
committee1s intended vote was received by the petitioner. 
The case was heard by an auditor who ordered the petition 
dismissed. The -petitioner alleged exceptions. In overruling 
29 
Moran vs. School Committee of Littleton, 317 Mass. 591* 
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the exceptions the Supreme Court said that no limitation 
is placed by this section on the power of a majority of 
the school committee to change or lessen the duty assigned 
to a teacher. 
The court also said: "The dismissal contemplated 
under section 42 of chapter 71 of the General Laws is a 
complete separation from the schools of the town; and it 
is not a mere change in assignment of duties resulting in 
lessened authority or scope of employment. A principal is 
a teacher who is entrusted with special duties of direction 
and management. 
School Committee Empowered to Change Duties of a Teacher 
on Tenure — The Supreme Court mentioned in ruling on the 
case of McDevitt vs. School Committee of Malden, in which 
a teacher who had been promoted to a principalship of a 
junior high school and demoted to a teacher before taking 
over the duties of a principal attempted to be reinstated 
as principal, that the general managerial powers of the 
school committee include the power to change by a majority 
vote the duties of teachers on tenure at discretion and to 
assign them to new duties, or to continue them in their ex¬ 
isting duties, or to return them to duties already performed, 
although such teachers cannot be dismissed from the teaching 
Boody vs. School Committee of Barnstable, 276, Mass. 
134. 
force without compliance with section 42, chapter 71 of 
31 
the General laws. 
A Principal Assigned to Duty a3 a Grade School Teacher 
is not "Dismissed" -- In the case of Downey vs. School 
Committee of Lowell, the Supreme Court ruled that a prin¬ 
cipal of a grammar school who has been assigned as a teacher 
in grammar school cannot come under the protection of 
section 42 as regards dismissal, as such person has not 
32 
been dismissed. 
Hearing is a Condition Precedent when Requested — A teacher, 
P. Gladys Perkins, on tenure in the public schools of Quincy, 
was notified that she was to be dismissed. She requested a 
hearing and specifications which were furnished. At the 
hearing on November 26, 1940, and after the close of the 
evidence when arguments of counsel were heard, only five of 
the seven members of the committee were in attendance. 
On December 10, 1940, the entire committee of seven 
members voted on her dismissal. The vote was six for dis¬ 
missal and one member voted present. 
Miss Perkins petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ 
/ 
of mandamus commanding the respondents (the committee) to 
restore her to her position. The case was transferred to the 
Superior Court, where the judge found the facts as stated in 
McDevitt vs. School Committee of Malden, 298 Mass. 213 
Downey vs. School Committee of Lowell, 3C5 Mass. 329. 
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the auditor's report. It then was reported to the Supreme 
Court for determination. 
The Supreme Court In rendering a decision in favor of 
the petitioner said that it was essential that a quorum of 
the committee he present at the hearing. The requirements 
for "a two-thirds vote of the whole committee" and for a hear¬ 
ing "before the school committee" necessarily imply that a 
quorum of the committee for the purpose of such a hearing 
must consist of not less than two-thirds of the whole com¬ 
mittee.®^ 
Participation in Hearing is Condition Precedent to Vote for 
Dismissal — The following opinion was handed down in Perkins 
vs. Quincy mentioned above. 
Where a hearing is requested by a teacher, 
such a hearing * before the school committee' of 
the nature described in section 42 of chapter 
71 of the General Laws as amended by Statute 
1934, chapter 123, is a condition precedent to 
dismissal of the teacher. 
A member of a school committee who was not 
present at a hearing held by the committee under 
section 42 . . ., did not participate in the 
hearing although thereafter he read the whole 
stenographic report. Therefore, the votes of 
two members of a school committee who did not 
participate in the hearing 'before the school 
committee', could not be counted in the 'two- 
thirds vote of the whole committee' required to 
dismiss a teacher. 
Section 42, as amended, in providing for a 
hearing before the school committee at which the 
teacher 'may be represented by counsel, present 
evidence and call witnesses to testify in his 
behalf and examine them* contemplates that each 
33 
Perkins vs. School Committee of Quincy, 315 Mass. 47. 
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member of the committee who votes for dis¬ 
missal shall be in the favorable position 
for decision of the matter that results from 
hearing and seeing the witnesses.34 
Vote to Dismiss is Vote that Charges have been Substan¬ 
tiated — Again in Perkins vs. School Committee of Quincy, 
the Supreme Court pointed out that a ”two-thirds vote of 
the whole committee’' to dismiss a teacher is, in substance, 
a vote that the charge or charges against that teacher 
have been ’’substantiated” by evidence introduced at the 
hearing. It is not a vote that as a matter of general 
policy, irrespective of the evidence introduced at the hear¬ 
ing, the teacher should be dismissed.55 
A Vote by a School Committee Member not Cast on Merits of 
the Question is not Valid — In two petitions filed in the 
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus (Sweeney vs. School 
Committee of Revere), the first was to direct the school 
committee of Revere to reinstate Leroy E. Sweeney as principal 
of the Junior high school and the second was to direct said 
committee to reinstate the other petitioner, William F. 
Pollard, as assistant principal of the senior high school, 
both at their former salaries. 
The school committee voted to consolidate the junior 






Sweeney and Pollard at lower salaries as teachers. There 
was no evidence of a superintendent's recommendation that 
the positions should he abolished. In the case of Pollard 
the record clearly showed that the votes of two members of 
the committee were actuated by feelings of political re¬ 
sentment. 
The full court in sustaining Pollard's petition with 
costs stated in part that the votes of the two committee 
members who were known to have been actuated by ill-will 
must be discounted and that therefore the vote dismissing 
Pollard failed of the necessary two-thirds and the petition¬ 
er must be reinstated to his former position. 
The court found the auditor's report to be as stated 
in the case of Sweeney. Consequently the votes of the two 
members which were discounted in Pollard's case could not 
be so treated here. Furthermore, the court ruled that the 
effect of this vote on the salary of Sweeney was not within 
the scope of section 43 as he was the only person of his 
class. This petition was dismissed.5® 
A Teacher who has not Received Required Notice cannot be 
D1smlssed — In Sweeney vs. School Committee of Revere, the 
Supreme Court stated further in respect to the other petition 
er, Pollard: 
36 
Sweeney vs. School Committee of Revere, 249 Mass. 525. 
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We do not consider that we are required to 
allow such a hoard to nullify the plain and 
salutory provisions of this statute by simply 
covering their unlawful acts with a virtuous 
name. The committee, to whose attention 
section 42 had been expressly called by one of 
its members, could not do indirectly that which 
it could not do directly. Pollard could not 
be dismissed as assistant principal of the high 
school unless he received the customary thirty 
days notice, as it was found that under the 
consolidation, the administrative duties of 
the principal of the combined schools would be 
so increased that the position of assistant 
principal at least would be as essential as it 
was before such reorganization.37 
But it was stated in Toothaker vs. School Committee of Rock¬ 
land, a case which is discussed below, that it was not 
necessary under section 42 to give a superintendent of schools 
notice that the committee was to vote on his dismissal at a 
certain meeting. This ruling was interpreted as dealing 
with a specific meeting. The superintendent had to be given 
the customary notice, but the committee was not required to 
specify the meeting at which the vote was to be taken. 
Committee is Bound to Act for Welfare of Schools — In 
Toothaker vs. Rockland, Oliver H. Toothaker petitioned the 
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the school 
committee of the town of Rockland to reinstate him to his 
former position as superintendent of schools. 




Toothaker vs. School Committee of Rockland, 256 Mass. 
584. 
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tion. The school committee of the town consisted of three 
members, two of whom were not favorable to the petitioner. 
The dismissal of the superintendent was the outstanding 
issue of the town election campaign in the year 1925 when 
one of the two committee members mentioned above was elected 
to office. 
On receiving notice of the committee’s intended action 
to obtain his dismissal, the petitioner requested a hearing 
and reasons for dismissal. He was notified that the reasons 
were "lack of harmony with the committee which was detrimen¬ 
tal to the welfare of the schools, and the belief that we 
can obtain and maintain a higher standard . . .with the 
assistance of some superintendent other than yourself," The 
petitioner was dismissed at a meeting of the school board on 
June 25, 1925. 
The case was first referred to an auditor, then heard 
by a single justice who denied the petition. The case then 
went to the full body of the Supreme Court which upheld the 
decision of its single justice who said in parts 
The vote to dismiss the petitioner was valid. 
Upon the evidence of the report of the auditor, 
I am unable to conclude that the action of the 
members of the committee was dictated solely by 
personal ill will. The vote of the town had no 
binding or legal effect to control the action 
of members of the committee; but they could con¬ 
sider in deciding what was for the welfare of 
the schools the feeling of large numbers of 




Lack of Harmony and Cooperation if Detrimental to Welfare 
of Schools are Sufficient Grounds for Dismissal — In 
Toothaker vs. Rockland the single justice of the Supreme 
Court stated further as follows: 
Dealing with the matter as one of dis¬ 
cretion, I do not feel that one whose useful¬ 
ness as a superintendent is so doubtful in 
view of the circumstances disclosed by the 
evidence, should be retained in office by 
this court; even though his ability and 
willingness to render good service to the 
schools of Rockland are as great as, from the 
evidence, I believe them to be, and although 
his dismissal is so likely to be a cause of 
regret to the committee and the town.^O 
Adjournment of Meeting Concerning Dismissal until a Late 
Date in Compliance with Section Forty-two — In the same 
case, Toothaker vs. Rockland, it was decided that a meeting 
of a school committee of three at which one of the committee 
did not attend but of which he had sufficient notice was in 
compliance with section 42, and the members present could 
lawfully adjourn until a later day when final action upon 
the dismissal of the superintendent was taken by a two- 
41 
thirds vote. 
Counsel May Appear for the Committee — The Supreme Court 
ruled also in Toothsker vs. Rockland that it was not contrary 
to section 42 for counsel to appear for the committee at a 






the regularity and validity of the action taken.42 
"Superintendent to Recommend Dismissal” Applies to All 
Public Schools -- Duffey vs. School Committee of Hopkinton 
is a case in which Ellen L. Duffey petitioned the Supreme 
Court for a writ of mandamus to secure reinstatement as a 
teacher in the public schools of Hopkinton, a position from 
which the petitioner alleged she was wrongfully removed. 
Miss Duffey was employed on tenure when she was noti¬ 
fied of the intended action of the committee and the reason 
given was "conduct unbecoming a teacher and insubordination." 
The superintendent did not recommend the dismissal. She was 
dismissed at a meeting of the committee held December 6, 1919. 
The chief question presented was whether the Statute 
1914, chapter 714, which required the superintendents re¬ 
commendation for dismissal, was applicable to a town like 
Hopkinton which was joined with other towns to form a superin¬ 
tendency union. 
The Supreme Court in sustaining the petition and order¬ 
ing the petitioner reinstated to her position formerly held 
said as follows: 
The advice of the superintendent, who may be 
presumed to possess more than the ordinary skill 
and judgment touching the general competency and 
usefulness of teachers, may be quite as necessary 
in order to prevent injustice and to insure the 
highest possible efficiency of the public schools 




No recommendation by the superintendent of 
schools was made as to the proposed dismissal 
of the petitioner; hence the school committee 
acted beyond their power in attempting to 
discharge the petitioner from service. 
Recommendation of Superintendent Need not Favor Dismissal — 
Sheldon vs. School Committee of Hopedale is a case in which 
Elba Sherburne Sheldon petitioned the Supreme Court for a 
writ of mandamus to compel the school committee of Hopedale 
to reinstate her as a teacher in the public schools of the 
town. 
The petitioner was dismissed by the school committee 
on October 14, 1930, pursuant to a rule passed at a meeting 
on May 20, 1930, to instruct the superintendent of schools 
to "eliminate from our teaching force female married teachers,” 
This vote of May was taken without prior specific recommen¬ 
dation in regard thereto by the superintendent. 
The case was heard before a single justice who ordered 
the petition dismissed as the "committee throughout acted 
in good faith and in the belief that their rule was of bene¬ 
fit to the schools." The petitioner excepted and the case 
X 
went before the full court. This body stated in part that it 
was not necessary to the validity of such dismissal that the 
recommendation to the committee by the superintendent under 
section 42 favor dismissal; that statute requires that the 
committee have the superintendents advice, but it is not in- 
43 School Committee of Hopkinton, 236 Mass. 5. Duffey vs. 
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tended that their action be controlled thereby.44 
Thanksgiving Recess not a Vacation Period — The case of 
Duffey vs. Hopkinton brought forth the opinion from the 
Supreme Court that the Thanksgiving recess is not a vaca¬ 
tion within the meaning of section 42, requiring notice of 
dismissal T,at least thirty days prior to the meeting ex¬ 
clusive of customary vacation periods. 
Conduct Unbecoming a Teacher and Insubordination are Suffi¬ 
cient Grounds for Dismissal — The Supreme Court decided 
also in Duffey vs. Hopkinton that where the reasons for which 
dismissal is proposed are "conduct unbecoming a teacher and 
insubordination”, that is a sufficient compliance with the 
terms of section 42, at least in the absence of demand for 
46 
more specific specifications. 
"Good Cause” is any Ground that is in Good Faith — Rinaldo 
vs. School Committee of Revere is a case in which Clara 
Rinaldo petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus 
to secure her reinstatement as a teacher in the public 
schools of Revere. 
The petitioner was serving on tenure in said City when 
the school committee passed a ruling that marriage of a woman 
teacher would operate as an automatic resignation of said 
teacher and that the regulation would apply to teachers on 
44 Sheldon vs. School Committee of Hopedale, 276 Mass. 230. 
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tenure. The petitioner was well aware of this rule, as her 
contracts contained express stipulations that marriage would 
terminate her contract, to which she assented. In June, 
1935, she married. The following September the school com¬ 
mittee would not permit her to teach, and on November 12, 
1935, after a notice and a hearing, she was dismissed, the 
causes stated being her violation of the terms of the contract. 
There was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the com¬ 
mittee. 
The case was heard by a single justice who found 
material facts and reported the case for hearing to the full 
court. This body, in deciding on whether such a policy 
adapted by the school committee could be found to be "good 
cause" under section 42 stated as follows: 
1 Good cause* includes any ground which is put 
forward by the committee in good faith and which 
is not arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, or 
irrelevant to the committee*s task of building 
up and maintaining an efficient school system. 
If the cause for dismissal is at least fairly 
debatable and is asserted honestly, and not as a 
subterfuge, that is enough. It is by no means 
limited to some form of inefficiency or mis¬ 
conduct on the part of the person dismissed. The 
statutory power was in fact followed. 
On the basis of this finding, the Supreme Court dismissed the 
47 
petition. 
Hearing not Illegal if Case not Reached for Hearing until 
Late in Evening -- In the case of Houghton vs. School Com- 
Rinaldo vs. School Committee of Revere, 296 Mass. 167. 
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mittee of Somerville it was brought out that a hearing, 
under section 42, of a case which need take but a short 
time was not illegal in that the case was not reached for 
a hearing until 10:15 o’clock in the evening,48 
Reports of Conduct Resulting in Dismissal not Sufficient 
Evidence to Warrant an Action for Unlawful Interference — 
The case of Caverno vs. Fellows, discussed at the begin¬ 
ning of this chapter, indicates that an action for unlawful 
interference, on the part of the plaintiff’s immediate 
superior teacher in the high school, of the principal, and 
of the superintendent, with the plaintiff’s right to continue 
as a teacher under tenure could not be maintained on evidence 
merely that the defendants made reports of conduct of the 
plaintiff which resulted In her dismissal by the school com¬ 
mittee, there being no evidence that the conduct of any of 
the defendants was actuated by ill will toward, or a purpose 
to harm, the plaintiff, rather than by a justifiable purpose 
49 
to perform their respective duties. 
A Delay In Bringing Petition for a Court Writ doe3 not Con¬ 
stitute Negligence to Bar It -- This case, Peckham vs. Mayor 
of Fall River, while not provoked by any of the sections 
under discussion, is cited because of a decision that might 
very readily be of use in any case based upon a petition for 
48 Houghton vs. School Committee of Somerville, 506 Mass. 
542. 
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Caverno vs. Fellows, 300 Mass. 331. 
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a writ of mandamus. 
Lester M. Peekham filed a petition in the Supreme 
Court on April 22, 1925, for a writ of mandamus directing 
the mayor and commissioners of the reservoir commission of 
Fall River to reinstate the petitioner "in his employment 
as an ox driver in the reservoir department . . . 
The petitioner was appointed to his position under 
civil service and was so employed until July 12, 1924, when 
he was suspended without notice and without a hearing al¬ 
though there was work to be done of which he was capable of 
doing and willing to do. 
A single justice ordered the petition dismissed. Ex¬ 
ceptions by the petitioner to this order brought the case 
to the full court. The full court, in reversing the order 
of the single justice and sustaining the petition, said that 
the petitioner could be dismissed only in the manner pointed 
out in sections 43 and 45 of chapter 31 of the General Laws 
which entitle a civil service employee to a hearing and that 
if the petition had been brought immediately after his sus¬ 
pension, he would have been entitled to relief. Consequently 
his delay from the date of his suspension to the date of 
50 
petition does not bar relief nor constitute neglect. 
Committee Member who is Biased or Prejudiced not Required to 
Withdraw from Board under Certain Conditions -- In Moran vs. 
50 
Peekham vs. Mayor of Fall River, 253 Mass. 590. 
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School Committee of Littleton, the petitioner, John Geddes 
Moran, having been removed from his position as principal 
of the high school of Littleton after a public hearing upon 
charges preferred by the school committee, appealed from an 
order of the Superior Court dismissing a petition for a writ 
of mandamus which he brought to secure his reinstatement. 
During his hearing before the committee, two of the 
three members who then constituted the committee testified 
under oath as witnesses, and were examined by counsel for the 
petitioner. Each of them after testifying resumed his duties 
as a member of the committee. 
In affirming the order of the Superior Court dismissing 
the petition, the Supreme Court pointed out that it is a 
general rule based on necessity and designed to enable an 
administrative board to exercise its power where it might 
otherwise be barred from so doing on account of the bias, in¬ 
terest, or prejudice of one or more of its members, that a 
member who is biased or prejudiced against one on trial before 
the board is not required to withdraw from the hearing if no 
other board can hear and determine the matter being heard, 
especially if his withdrawal would deprive the board of the 
51 
number of members required to take a valid affirmative vote. 
Committee Member who Testifies as Witness not Disqualified 
from Participating in Decisions of Committee — The Supreme 
H 
Moran vs. School Committee of Littleton, 317 Mass. 591. 
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Court stated further in Moran vs. Littleton: 
The mere fact, that at a hearing by a school 
committee of charges preferred by it under 
chapter 71, section 42 as appearing in Statute 
1934, chapter 123 against a teacher serving at 
its discretion, two of its three members testi¬ 
fied under oath as witnesses and were examined 
by the committee^ counsel and cross examined 
by counsel for the teacher, did not disqualify 
the two from resuming their function as members 
of the committee and participating in its de¬ 
cision.52 
Error in Proceedings Prejudicial to Dismissed Teacher is 
Basis for Court Action — The opinion was handed down in 
Moran vs. Littleton that a school teacher dismissed by the 
committee following proceedings under General Law chapter 
71, section 42, as appearing in Statute 1934, chapter 123, 
is not entitled to a writ of mandamus to secure his rein¬ 
statement unless he proves that the school committee com¬ 
mitted an error in such proceedings and that the error was 
prejudicial to hlm.^ 
Admission of Affidavits as Evidence not Prejudicial if 
Charges Substantiated Otherwise -- The Supreme Court further 
stated in Moran vs. Littleton: 
We think one has no just ground of complaint 
because an administrative board in conducting 
a hearing of charges against him has permitted 
the introduction of hearsay evidence ^affi¬ 
davit a _7 when he has failed to show that the 
other evidence was not adequate to support the 
conclusion reached by the board. The burden 






in a substantial injustice to him. That does 
not appear on this record.54 
Answers to Questions on Section Forty-two 
1. Must the school committee elaborate on specifica¬ 
tions for dismissal? — A statement of reasons for 
dismissal is sufficient compliance with section 
42, and a committee need not elaborate on such speci¬ 
fications. 
2. Is the statutory power of a school committee strict¬ 
ly or freely construed? — The statutory power of 
a school committee has always been freely construed. 
3. What is the meaning of the term "judicial investi¬ 
gation” as it applies here? — A hearing under 
section 42 is in the nature of a judicial investi¬ 
gation after preferment of charges and notice, and 
the establishment of sufficient cause for dismissal 
by adequate evidence. 
4. What is the meaning of the word "substantiated” as 
it applies here? — The word "substantiated” has 
been defined to mean ”to establish the existence or 
truth of, by true or competent evidence.” 
5. What teachers are covered by this section? -- 





6. Does a vote of dismissal indicate that the 
charges have been substantiated? — A two-thirds 
vote of the whole committee to dismiss a teacher 
is, in substance, a vote that the charges have 
been substantiated by evidence Introduced at the 
hearing. 
7. Must the school committee always act in the inter¬ 
est of the schools? -- The school committee must 
always act in a manner which will be to the best 
interests of the schools. 
8. Is the committee empowered to change duties of a 
teacher on tenure? — The general managerial powers 
of the school committee include the power to change 
by a majority vote the duties of teachers on tenure 
at discretion and to assign them to new duties. 
9. May counsel appear for the committee? — It is not 
contrary to section 42 for counsel to appear for 
the committee at a hearing on dismissal. 
10. Must recommendation of superintendent favor dis¬ 
missal? — The statute requires that the committee 
have the superintendents advice, but it is not 
intended that their action be controlled thereby. 
11. What constitutes "good cause"? — "Good cause" 
includes any ground which is put forward by the 
committee in good faith and which is not arbitrary, 
irrational, unreasonable, or irrelevant to the 
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committee! s task of building up and maintain¬ 
ing an efficient system, 
12. Must a board member who is prejudiced withdraw 
from board during vote on dismissal? — A member 
who is prejudiced against one on trial before a 
board is not required to withdraw from the hear¬ 
ing if no other board can hear and determine the 
matter being heard, especially if his withdrawal 
would deprive the board of the number of members 
required to take a valid affirmative vote. 
13. Does the section afford any protection to a 
teacher on tenure over one not on tenure, if a 
dismissal is required because of a decrease in 
enrolment? — At present a teacher on tenure has 
no protection over one not on tenure if a dis¬ 
missal is required because of a decrease of en¬ 
rolment. However, House Bill 365 which is due 
shortly for hearing before the Legislature is de¬ 
signed to protect the teacher on tenure if a dis¬ 
missal is required because of a decrease of 
enrolment. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON SECTION FORTY-THREE 
Section 43 of chapter 71 of the General Laws (Tercen¬ 
tenary Edition) of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is 
stated here. 
Salary Law — 
The salary of no teacher employed in any 
town except Boston to serve at discretion 
shall be reduced without his consent except 
by a general salary revision affecting equally 
all teachers of the same salary grade In the 
town. The salary of no superintendent so 
employed shall be reduced without his consent 
until at least one year after the committee 
has so voted, 
A few questions have arisen in connection with this 
section. The questions are: 
1. What effect does a reduction from principal to 
teacher have on salary? 
2. Does section 43 cover a reduction of salary made 
in bad faith? 
3. What is the interpretation of the term "same 
salary grade?” 
4. Does the section protect a salary the right to 
which was never vested? 
5. What is the effect of dismissal made In good faith 
before end of school year on remainder of salary? 
The Supreme Court decisions on cases provoked by section 
43 are presented herewith, following which the questions 
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listed above are answered* 
of Reduction of Rank on Salary — — In Downey vs • School 
Committee of Lowell where Miss Downey attempted to obtain 
court action to effect her reinstatement to the rank and 
salary of principal following a vote of the school committee 
to close the school of which she was principal and to re¬ 
duce her to a teacher in another elementary school, originally 
at the same salary, but later at a lower salary, the Supreme 
Court said: 
The fact that the petitioner was chosen as 
a grammar school principal, and was paid the 
same salary as other such principals, does not 
show that she was in the 1 same salary grade' 
as the others after her school was closed and 
theirs was left open. She was not entitled to 
be classed with them as to salary after that 
marked change in situation occurred. After 
that change she was the only person in her 
'salary grade' and section 43 afforded her no 
protection.55 
A similar decision was arrived at in Sweeney vs. Revere.^ 
Reduction of Salary Made in Bad Faith — The Supreme Court 
held in Downey vs. Lowell that there was nothing to show any 
want of good faith in the reduction of salary in this case. 
It said: 
We assume without deciding that the employ¬ 
ment of the petitioner by the school committee 
'to serve at its discretion' prevented a re¬ 
duction of salary made in bad faith for the 
purposes of punishment or favoritism, even 
though the specific provision of section 43 did 
Downey vs. School Committee of Lowell, 305 Mass. 329. 
56 
Sweeney vs. School Committee of Revere, 249 Mass. 525. 
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not apply.57 
Interpretation of Term "Same Salary Grade" — The Supreme 
Court clarified the term Msame salary grade” in Paquette vs. 
Pall River. Here the court said: 
The word ’grade* in this section is designed 
plainly to include 811 public school teachers 
employed in a particular municipality, regard¬ 
less of the name of the school in which the 
service may be rendered. The word ’grade’ is 
broad enough also to comprise tenure of office. 
Clearly identity of salary is not the sole 
test in determining ’same salary grade*. It 
is only one factor in determining whether speci¬ 
fied teachers are ’of the same salary grade*. 
In deciding whether a general salary revision 
affects all teachers ’of same salary grade’, 
consideration must be given not only to salary 
received, but also to the sum of the factors 
comprehended within the scope of ’grade*. 
Two teachers, one having a contract for one 
year only and the other having a continuous 
and indeterminate service, cannot rightly be 
said to be in the same salary grade even though 
receiving identical sums as salary.^8 
Section Forty-three not Intended to Protect a "Salary” the 
Right to Which never became Vested — In McDevitt vs. Malden 
where the petitioner sought reinstatement to a position as 
principal and to be paid the salary which was voted with 
said position while he had never assumed such duties because 
of a vote of the next committee which declared said position 
* » 
vacant, and demoted him to his former rank, the Supreme 
Court stated that the petitioner was not entitled to the in¬ 
crease in salary as it was not the intent of section 43 to 
Downey vs. School Committee of Lowell, 305 Mass. 329. 
Paquette vs. School Committee of Fall River, 278 Mass. 
172. 
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protect a "salary" the right to which never became vested.59 
Effect of Dismissal Made in Good Faith before End of School 
Year on Salary — In the case of Wood vs. Inhabitants of 
Medfield, Cornelius E. Wood attempted to recover $150 alleged 
due him as unpaid salary as a teacher in the high school of 
Medfield in Superior Court without Jury. 
His contract for the year 1873-1874, with the under¬ 
standing that he teach for the year, was $1200. The school 
committee voted to close the school on May 29, 1874, and 
discharge the teacher. They notified the plaintiff that his 
services were no longer required but gave no reason for their 
action. 
The Superior Court Judge ordered Judgment for the de¬ 
fendant. The plaintiff alleged exceptions and the case went 
to the Supreme Court. In overruling the exceptions the 
Supreme Court said that there was no authority in law by 
which a school committee can bind the town to pay for the 
services of a teacher after he shall have been discharged by 
60 
the school committee acting under its obligations of duty. 
Answers to Questions Concerning Section Forty-three 
1. What effect does a reduction from a principal to 
a teacher have on salary? — If a teacher is,. 
after said reduction, the only person of "the same 
McDevitt vs. School Committee of Malden, 298 Mass. 213. 
Wood vs. Inhabitants of Medfield, 123 Mass. 545. 
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salary grade", and has been demoted in good 
faith, he has no recourse through law to demand 
the salary that went with the higher rank. 
2. Does section 43 cover a reduction of salary made 
in bad faith? — A teacher who has been voted a 
reduction in salary may recover if the reduction 
was made in bad faith. 
3. What is the interpretation of the term "same 
salary grade?" — "Same salary grade" involves a 
consideration not only of salary received, but 
also the sum factors comprehended within the 
scope of "grade" such as tenure. 
4. Does the section protect a salary the right to 
which was never vested? — Section 43 does not 
protect such a salary. 
5. What is the effect of dismissal made in good faith 
before end of school year on remainder of salary? - 
There is no authority under law to compel a town 
to pay for services after a teacher has been dis¬ 
charged in good faith. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND OPINION OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON SECTION SIXTY-THREE 
CHAPTER VI 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND OPINION OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON SECTION SIXTY-THREE 
Section 63 of chapter 71 of the General Laws (Ter¬ 
centenary Edition) of the Coimnonwealth of Massachusetts 
is stated in part below. 
Tenure of Office and Dismissal of Superintendents of School 
Unions — 
year term, a superintendent of schools, deter¬ 
mine the relative amount of service to be 
rendered by him in each town, fix his salary, 
which shall not be reduced during his term. . . . 
He may be removed, with the consent of the de¬ 
partment, by a two thirds vote of the full 
membership of the joint committee. A superin¬ 
tendent In a union who has served continuously 
in the same union for more than three years 
and who has been employed at least twice as 
superintendent In said union, each for a term 
of three years, shall not be removed except for 
inefficiency. Insubordination or other good 
cause, nor without full compliance with the pro¬ 
visions of section forty-two, relative to 
teachers and other superintendents, as to notice 
of intention to dismiss, specification of 
charges, hearing and substantiation of charges. 
Section 2. Notwithstanding the provisions 
of section one of this act, a superintendent of 
a superintendency union In office on its effective 
date shall not be entitled to the benefits there¬ 
of except after he has been re-employed in said 
office. 
The questions which have arisen in connection with section 
63 are: 
!• Do teachers come under this section? 
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2. Are acts of joint committee binding on each of 
the towns comprising the union? 
3. Who can discharge a union superintendent? 
4. Can a union superintendent be appointed for less 
than a three year term? 
5. Can a union superintendent be dismissed while on 
tenure? 
6. Has a joint committee the right to rescind a vote 
for a superintendent? 
The Supreme Court decisions and the opinion of the 
attorney general on cases brought about by this section are 
presented below. They are followed by the answers to the 
above questions. 
Teachers in a Superintendency Union not under Section Sixty- 
three — The Supreme Court decided in the case of Duffey vs. 
School Committee of Hopkinton that section 42 included all 
teachers within the Commonwealth. Consequently there are no 
61 
provisions for teachers in section 63. 
Joint Committee Agent for Each Town — Freeman vs. Inhabitants 
of Bourne, was a case involving an action of contract on the 
part of the superintendent of the school district of Sandwich, 
Bourne, and Mashpee against the town of Bourne to recover 
salary which the plaintiff alleged was owed to him. 
Howard S. Freeman was elected superintendent of said 
61 Duffey vs. School Committee of Hopkinton, 236 Mass. 5. 
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district at a meeting of the joint committees on October 9, 
1893, following a meeting at which the former superinten¬ 
dent, who was under indictment for adultery, had been dis¬ 
missed. The school committee of the defendant town protested 
against such action and continued the former superintendent 
in office in that town. The plaintiff assumed his duties in 
the district on November 7, 1893 and was reelected again in 
April, 1894, to take effect June 15, 1894. Between these 
two dates the plaintiff received no salary from the defendant 
town. 
The case was submitted tm the Superior Court, and after 
Judgment for the plaintiff, to the Supreme Court, on appeal. 
The Supreme Court in affirming judgment for the plaintiff 
said in part: ’’For the purposes of the statute (Statute 
1888, chapter 431), the joint committee became the agents of 
each town, and their acts within the scope of their authority 
are binding upon each town.”^ 
Superintendent under Control of Joint Committee — In Freeman 
vs. Bourne the Supreme Court said: ’’When several towns unite 
for the purpose of the employment of a superintendent of 
schools under the authority of section 63, such superinten¬ 
dent can be employed only by the Joint committee, and can 
be discharged only by the joint committee, if the power of 
62 
Freeman vs. Inhabitants of Bourne, 170 Mass. 289. 
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dismissal exists."^ 
Union Superintendent must be Appointed for Three Years — 
In a letter to the State Commissioner of Education dated 
December 3, 1919, the Attorney General stated In request to 
an opinion concerning the legality of electing a union 
superintendent temporarily for a period of six months: "It 
is my opinion that a superintendent must be employed for a 
three year term, regardless of when employment begins."64 
Union Superintendent may, under Certain Conditions, be 
Dismissed while under Tenure — In Freeman vs. Bourne the 
court decided that In the selection and employment of a 
superintendent of schools there Is an implied condition which 
authorizes his dismissal, if circumstances arise which render 
him no longer able or fit to perform the duties of his posi¬ 
tion. 
Committee may Declare Office of Union Superintendent Vacant — 
Again referring to Freeman vs. Bourne, the Supreme Court 
ruled in this case that the pendency of an indictment for 
adultery against a superintendent of schools, chosen by a 
joint committee formed by the school committees of towns 
■uniting for the purpose of the employment of a superintendent 





Opinion of Attorney General, Vol. 5, p. 422. 
Freeman vs. Inhabitants of Bourne, 170 Mass. 289. 
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office vacant.66 
Right of a Committee to Rescind. Vote for a Superintendent —— 
In Reed vs. School Committee of Deerfield and another, 
William A. Reed petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of 
mandamus to compel the school committee of Deerfield and the 
petitioner’s predecessor in office to recognize the vote of 
the joint committee of Hatfield, Leverett, and Deerfield 
which elected him as superintendent of the school union com¬ 
prising those three towns. 
At a meeting of the joint committee on April 7, 1900, 
the petitioner’s predecessor, then in office, received a 
fraction of a vote over another candidate for the position 
of superintendent. The chairman declared that there had 
been no election, and the meeting was adjourned until April 
21, 1900. The respondent. Barton, continued to serve as 
superintendent until this petition was filed. 
At the meeting held on April 21, 1900, it was voted to 
rescind the vote of the previous meeting. The meeting then 
proceeded to the election of a new superintendent. The 
petitioner received twelve votes and Barton received eleven 
votes. The chairman declared the petitioner elected, and no 
objection was made thereto. 




intendent of schools and began his duties on April 26, 1900. 
On May 7, 1900, he received a notice from the Deerfield com¬ 
mittee that they would recognize Barton as superintendent. 
The Supreme Court in sustaining the petition pointed 
out that, at the first meeting, the respondent. Barton, was 
elected and should have been elected by the chair. However, 
this was not done and the committee rescinded the vote which 
elected Barton. On this point the court stated: "We are 
of the opinion that it was. within the power of the meeting 
n 07 
to rescind its vote." 
Answers to Questions Concerning Section Sixty-three — 
1. Do teachers come under this section? — Teachers 
do not come under this section, but under sections 
41, and 42. 
2. Are acts of joint committee binding on each of the 
towns comprising the union? — The joint committee 
are the agents for each town, and their acts with¬ 
in the scope of their authority are binding upon 
each town. 
3. Who can discharge a union superintendent? — Where 
several towns unite for the purpose of employment 
of a superintendent of schools, such superintendent 
can be discharged only by the joint committee, if 
the power of dismissal exists. 
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Reed vs. School Committee of Deerfield & another, 172 
Mass. 473. 
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4. Can a union Superintendent be appointed for less 
than a three year term? — A union superintendent 
must be employed for a three year term, regard¬ 
less of when employment begins. 
5. Can a union superintendent be dismissed while on 
tenure? — A union superintendent can be dismissed 
while on tenure, if circumstances arise which render 
him no longer able or fit to perform the duties of 
his position. 
6. Has a joint committee the right to rescind a vote 
for a superintendent? — It is within the power 







This study has offered first, in chapter two, a 
history of the laws regarding tenure which shows the devel¬ 
opment of these laws to the present day. It has offered 
also, in following chapters, an analysis of Supreme Court 
decisions and opinions of attorney generals dealing with the 
tenure laws. On the basis of the information contained in 
the previous chapters an attempt is made here to arrive at 
a conclusion which will answer the main question which pro¬ 
voked this study, namely: "What protection do the laws of 
Massachusetts give to me as a teacher in the public schools 
of the state in regard to the permanency of my position?" 
The introduction broke this question down into a series of 
more specific questions. The procedure here will be to answer 
these specific questions and use these answers as the basis 
for an answer to the general question. 
Meaning of the Word "Tenure" and its Purpose — Tenure Is de¬ 
fined as "the term of holding office."^® It is a status to 
which teachers, supervisors, principals and superintendents 
attain upon fulfillment of the conditions of the tenure 
statute. The purpose of the tenure statute has been declared 
68 Devlin, Joseph, Webster's New Standard Dictionary;, the 
World Syndicate Publishing Company, p. 956. 
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to be the promotion of "good order and the welfare of the 
state and of the school system by preventing the removal 
of capable and experienced teachers at the political or 
personal whim of changing office holders." 
Laws Pertaining to Tenure — As has been pointed out pre¬ 
viously, the laws regarding the tenure of teachers in Massa¬ 
chusetts are contained in sections 41, 42, 43, and 63 of 
chapter 71 of the General Laws (Tercentenary Edition) of 
go 
Massachusetts. Section 41 concerns itself with the condi¬ 
tions which must be met by a teacher in order to attain the 
tenure status and with the necessity of the school board*s 
compliance. Section 42 treats of the procedure which must be 
followed by a school committee to dismiss a teacher and the 
rights to which a teacher has access if he is about to be 
dismissed. Section 43 deals with the salary rights of teachers 
and is included in this study because of the importance a 
reduction in salary plays in relation to the attractiveness 
of a position. Section 63 contains the 18W relative to the 
employment, tenure, dismissal, and salary of superintendents 
of superintendency unions. 
Those Protected by Tenure Laws -- The Supreme Court has ruled 
that all teachers, supervisors, and principals employed in 
the public schools of the state, except in Boston, and all 
superintendents, except those in Boston and those employed by 
69 
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superintendency unions, are protected by the laws contain¬ 
ed in sections 41, 42, and 43 of chapter 71. Union superin¬ 
tendents are protected by section 63 of the same chapter. 
Conditions for Dismissal -- The conditions under which a 
teacher on tenure may be dismissed have been brought out quite 
clearly in several cases before the Supreme Court. In 
Rinaldo vs. Revere, the decision wss based on ’’good cause”, 
a term existing in section 42. Here the court stated: 
•Good cause* includes any ground which is 
put forward by the committee in good faith and 
which is not arbitrary, irrational, unreason¬ 
able, or irrevelant to the committee*s task 
of building up and maintaining an efficient 
school system. If the cause for dismissal is 
at least fairly debatable and is asserted 
honestly, and not as a subterfuge, that is 
enough. It is by no means limited to some 
form of inefficiency or misconduct on the 
part of the person dismissed. 
It follows from the above definition that marriage of a woman 
teacher can be classed as ’’good cause” within the meaning 
of section 42 If a school committee honestly rules it so. 
It Is to be understood that the conditions for dis¬ 
missal as stated in section 42 must be complied with entirely. 
The previous chapters contain many decisions in which the 
court compelled the school committee to reinstate a teacher 
for failure to comply with such Items as a two thirds vote 
of the whole committee, thirty days notice, a hearing and 
specifications In writing if requested, substantiation of 
70 
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charges, and recommendation of the superintendent in the 
case of a teacher, supervisor, or principal. The same re¬ 
quirements are contained in section 63. 
Dismissal of Teacher Serving on Tenure because of Decreased 
Enrolment — As the law stands at present, a teacher serving 
on tenure may be dismissed if there is a sufficient decrease 
in enrolment to render a decrease in the teaching force 
necessary. Under such a condition the committee is not re¬ 
quired to give a teacher a hearing or a notice, nor must 
\ 
charges be specified or substantiated in a judicial investi¬ 
gation. The law makes no provision to protect tenure 
teachers over non-tenure teachers in this respect although 
legislation is now pending to remedy this condition. 
Power of School Committee -- "The power of the school com- 
71 
mittee”, as stated in Pulvino vs. Yarmouth, "is conferred 
in the most general terms, and it is to be exercised when¬ 
ever in the judgment of those to whom it is committed the 
public good for any cause requires it. ^f this they shall 
be the exclusive judges.” 
The school committee must, in reappointing a teacher 
who has served for three consecutive previous years, appoint 
such teacher to serve at its discretion. In Paquette vs. 




just end proper in the circumstances."72 in connection with 
the powers of the school committee, it must be remembered 
that its powers are limited to the law and it cannot lengthen 
the three year tenure statute. 
Reinstatement of a Dismissed Teacher — The previous chapters 
record many cases where the Supreme Court has ordered rein¬ 
statement of teachers because the school committees failed 
to act in good faith or did not comply with each and every 
requirement of section 42 in effecting the dismissals. 
Tenure Laws may be Rendered Ineffective — A previous para¬ 
graph indicated the broad powers possessed by the school 
committee. This power is conferred on the school committee 
by the legislature. An opinion of an attorney general 
pointed out that as the legislature is empowered to enact laws, 
*7** 
it is also able to render such laws Ineffective. 
Teacher should Assert Rights — A tenure teacher who has been 
notified by the school committee of their intention to vote 
on his dismissal should lose no time In asserting his rights 
under the law if he believes the committee is acting un- 
' 
justly. Such rights consist of receiving a hearing and a 
written statement of charges, if requested. 
If a teacher has been dismissed and believes that the 
committee has acted unfairly, he should file in court a 






restore him to his position. 
Reduction of Salary to Force Resignation — If a teacher is 
the only one in "the same salary grade", his salary may be 
reduced in compliance with section 43. If, however, such 
reduction can be proved to have been made in bad faith, to 
✓ 
force a teacher*s resignation, that teacher may recover the 
loss of salary. 
It is apparent from the opinions of the Supreme Court 
that the law gives a considerable amount of protection to 
the positions of teachers serving on tenure. It is manda¬ 
tory that a school committee act in good faith, asserted 
honestly and not as a subterfuge. In effecting a dismissal 
of a tenure teacher. Furthermore, section 42 gives the 
teacher certain rights in connection with dismissal which are 
stated above In this chapter. 
It is remotely possible that a school board could act 
in bad faith on a dismissal and cover their action under 
the cloak of acting in the best interests of the schools. 
With the exception of this possibility and that of a tenure 
teacher being dismissed because of decreased enrolment, 
the facts indicate that a tenure teacher receives a high de¬ 
gree of protection from unjust Interference with his posi¬ 
tion in the public schools of Massachusetts. Statute 1934, 
chapter 123, increased greatly the degree of protection 
afforded a teacher on tenure. 
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Under such a high degree of protection as offered by 
the laws, it would prove unwise and useless on the part 
of a school committee to dismiss a teacher serving under 
tenure unless by so doing the committee was carrying out 
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COURT CASES AND OPINIONS IMPORTANT 
TO THIS STUDY 
This chapter consists of a presentation in alphabeti¬ 
cal order of the Supreme Court cases which were the main 
source of material for this study, followed by the two 
opinions of the attorney generals which were cited in pre¬ 
vious chapters, in lieu of an annotated bibliography. 
In the event that a reader is not familiar with the 
system of references used in connection with legal reports, 
an explanation is given here. All of the cases referred 
to in this study are cases that were decided on by the 
Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
These cases are recorded in the "Massachusetts Reports” which 
is the official title of the publication that reports on the 
cases decided on by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 
Consider as an example Graves vs. School Committee of Welles¬ 
ley, 299 Mass. 80 (1937). The number 299 represents the 
number of the volume of the Massachusetts Reports” in which 
the case is recorded. The ”Mass." indicates that the case 
is recorded in said reports, and the number 80 represents 
the page on which the record of the case begins. The 
number 1937 is not usually found in an arrangement of this 
type, as the volume number gives some idea as to the approxi¬ 
mate year in which the case went before the court. How¬ 
ever, as the average reader will not be able to determine 
the year under the usual arrangement, the liberty has been 
taken here to include it for the reader’s convenience. 
Boody vs. School Committee of Barnstable, 276 Mass. 134, 
T1931) — Louis M. Boody was employed on tenure by theSchool 
Committee of Barnstable, having served as a teacher and prin¬ 
cipal for many years. In 1929 the petitioner was elected by 
the committee, then consisting of three members, to be super¬ 
vising principal of the high and junior high schools at an 
annual salary of ^3,600. He performed these duties during 
the school year of 1929-1930. In the spring of 1930, the 
membership of the school committee was increased from three 
to five, and on September 18, 1930, the enlarged committee 
voted, three to two, to change Mr. Boody’s duties to those 
of a teacher in the high school. No change in salary was 
made. No notice was given Mr. Boody of the committee's in- 
tent to change his duties from principal to teacher prior 
to its meeting of September 18, 1930. 
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Boody petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of man¬ 
damus to compel the school committee to reinstate him as 
a supervising principal. The case was heard before an 
auditor and single member of the Supreme Court who ordered 
the petition dismissed. The petitioner alleged exceptions 
and the case went before the full court. 
The essential matter for decision before this body was 
whether under General Law chapter 71, section 42, as 
amended by Statute 1921, chapter 293, a majority vote or a 
two—thirds vote of the school committee was required where 
the duties of a teacher on tenure at discretion are changed 
from those of a principal to those merely of giving in¬ 
struction as a teacher. 
The court, in overruling the exceptions and finding 
for the respondent (school committee), stated that no limit¬ 
ation Is placed by this statute on the power of a majority 
of the school committee to change or lessen the duty 
assigned to a teacher. "We do not interpret the law as 
creating a class of principals as distinct from teachers.11 
Callahan vs. Woburn, 506 Mass. 265 (1940) — In an action 
of contract involving forty-one employees of the City of 
Woburn, the plaintiffs, some of whom were school teachers 
including Frank P. Callahan, sued the city for the balance 
of their lawfully fixed salaries, unpaid because of in¬ 
sufficient appropriations. The Superior Court of Middlesex 
found in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant, the City 
of Woburn, alleged exceptions and the Supreme Court sustain¬ 
ed the exceptions in favor of the city. The Supreme Court 
stated in Its decision that section 34 of chapter 71 of the 
General Laws, dealing with expenditures in anticipation of 
appropriations, provides the only remedy for recovery. The 
court also brought out that teachers who are not employed at 
discretion, although not covered by the provisions of 
sections 41, 42, and 43 of chapter 71 of the General Laws, 
are nevertheless under contract. 
Caverno vs. Fellows, 500 Mass. 531 (1938) -- This case was 
before the Supreme Court previously in 286 Mass. 440. The 
facts in the case, an action of tort, were the same In both 
cases with the exception that in the first case the plain¬ 
tiff alleged that the defendants. Fellows, Superintendent of 
Schools in Gloucester, Johnson, principal of the high school 
of said city, and Harris, supervisor of English in the high 
school "unlawfully and without justifiable cause did con¬ 
spire to have said plaintiff dismissed from her position as 
teacher in the high school and in pursuance of said con- 
spiracy made false, fictitious and fraudulent charges o e 
members of the school committee of the said city of Glouces¬ 
ter and did hamper, obstruct and impede the said plaintifi 
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in her work as a teacher . . . and did watch and annoy her 
and did make false and fictitious charges, accusations and 
statements about and against her,” 
The plaintiff taught under tenure in the high school. 
She was faculty advisor for a school news column which was 
published occasionally in the local paper. Evidence showed 
that the plaintiff had had difficulties with all three de¬ 
fendants which led up to her discharge. 
The defendants demurred to the declarations on the 
grounds that no particular false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
charge or act is specified. The Supreme Court sustained the 
demurra* to the declarations because there was no tort set 
out as to a single defendant. 
The plaintiff then alleged malicious interference on 
the part of the defendants in an amended declaration and the 
case went before a single justice of the Supreme Court in 
Caverno vs. Fellows, 300 Mass. 331 who returned a directed 
verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff excepted and the 
case went before the full court. The court overruled the 
exceptions stating that there was no evidence that the con¬ 
duct of any of the defendants was actuated by ill will toward, 
or a purpose to harm, the plaintiff, rather than by a justi¬ 
fiable purpose to perform their respective duties. 
Corrigan vs. School Committee of New Bedford, 250 Mass. 334 
n^Tr—'ThTi" case was the result of a petition by Alice T. 
Corrigan, the principal of a public school in New Bedford, 
for a writ of mandamus to compel the school committee to 
furnish her full and complete specifications of the reasons 
assigned by them for their contemplated action in proceeding 
to vote upon her dismissal as principal. 
She had been principal of the school in question for 
about twelve years before filing this petition. On June 29, 
1923, the school committee voted: "At a meeting of the 
school committee to be held on October 19, 1923, a vote shall 
be taken on the question of the dismissal of Alice T. Corri¬ 
gan, principal of the Betsey B. Winslow School, and* that 
notice be sent forthwith to her of this intention by the com¬ 
mittee." The petitioner then requested of the committee a 
statement "of its reasons for which her dismissal as principal 
is proposed." At a meeting of the committee held September 14, 
1923, the committee assigned and stated the reasons to be: 
"The committee1 s dissatisfaction with her work and the be¬ 
lief that she has not demonstrated constructive leadership 
and necessary administrative capability." On September 28, 
1923, the petitioner asked for more definite specifications 
to the committeefs reasons assigned for her dismissal. The 
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committee refused the request and set October 19, 1923, 
as the date for a hearing. 
The Supreme Court petition was filed October 18, 1923, 
and upon a hearing, a single justice denied the petition 
for a writ of mandamus. The petitioner excepted and the 
case went before the full court. In overruling the except¬ 
ions the court 3aid in part: "Teachers are employed in the 
discretion of the school committee and discretion in itself 
must imply freedom to act according to onefs own judgment. 
The only limitation on that freedom material to this case 
is that the committee shall upon request of the teacher 
give a statement of the reasons for which the dismissal is 
proposed. These reasons were given and are a sufficient 
ground for removal.” 
Davis vs. School Committee of Somerville, 307 Mass. 354 
(1940) ~ This case involved a petition for a writ of* man- 
darnus to restore the petitioner. Hazel M. Davis, to active 
service as a teacher in the public schools of the City of 
Somerville. The case was heard by a single justice and then 
by the full body of the Supreme Court. 
The petitioner had been employed on tenure in Somer¬ 
ville and prior to that time in the town of Acton and con¬ 
sequently had "completed more than twenty years of creditable 
service as a member of the Teachers* Retirement Association.” 
The petitioner claimed failure on the part of the school 
committee to notify the retirement board within five days 
after her dismissal with a fair summary of the facts re¬ 
lating to her removal and that her removal consequently be¬ 
came null and void and that she should be restored to active 
service without loss of compensation. 
The court in dismissing the petition brought out that 
the statute requiring notice to the retirement board refers 
to civil service employees and not to teachers. The court 
said further: ”0ne of the most important duties involved 
in the management of a school system is the choosing of 
competent teachers. The success of a school system depends 
largely on the character and ability of the teachers, un¬ 
less a school committee has authority to employ and discharge 
teachers it would be difficult to perform properly its duty 
of managing a school system.” 
Downey vs. School Committee of Lowell, 505 Mass._529 (1940) - 
iarollne A. Downey filed a petition In the Supreme 
a writ of mandamus to require the school committee of Lovell 
to restore her to the rank and salary as 
grammar school. A single justice found the facts to be 
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stated in the report of an auditor and ordered the peti¬ 
tion dismissed, but not on the grounds of discretion. The 
petitioner excepted to the order and the case went to the 
full court. 
The facts in the case were these: The petitioner 
served, under tenure, as principal of a grammar school in 
Lowell at a salary of $3,600 until June, 1937, when the 
school was closed by the committee in the interests of 
economy. At the reopening of schools in September, 1937, 
the petitioner, though elected as a principal, was assigned 
by the superintendent as a grade teacher in another school, 
under the principal of that school. She continued to re¬ 
ceive the pay of a principal until the beginning of 1938, 
when by vote of the school committee her pay was reduced to 
that of a grade teacher, $1,700 a year. She was the only 
grammar school principal without a school in which to act 
as principal. Various members of the school committee told 
her informally that when a vacancy occurred in a grammar 
school principalship she should have the place. But when 
in 1938 two such vacancies occurred, other persons were 
chosen to fill them. 
The Supreme Court in overruling the exceptions stated 
in part: HThe fact that the petitioner was chosen as a 
grammar school principal, and was paid the same salary as 
other such principals, does not show that she was in fthe 
same salary grade1 as the others after her school was closed 
and theirs was left open. After that change, she was the 
only person in her 1 salary grade* and section 43 afforded 
her no protection. 
HWe assume-wlthout deciding that the employment of the 
petitioner by the school committee * to serve at its dis¬ 
cretion* prevented a reduction in salary made in bad faith 
for purposes of punishment or favoritism, even though the 
specific provisions of section 43 did not apply. 
“When no law has been violated, and no statute has 
made good faith essential to valid action, acts of adminis¬ 
trative officers cannot be attacked in judicial proceedings 
on the ground that in fact these officers were not governed 
by the highest standards of impartial snd unselfish per¬ 
formance of public duty.'1 
Duffey vs. School Committee of Hopklnton, 256 Mass. 5 (1920) 
Ellen L. Duffey petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of 
mandamus to secure reinstatement as a teacher in the public 
schools of Hopkinton, a position from which the petitioner 
alleged that she had been wrongfully removed. 
The petitioner had been a teacher in the high school 
of Hopkinton from September, 1913, until December, 1919, 
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when she was dismissed by a two thirds vote of the committee. 
She was notified in writing by letter dated November 1, 1919 
' j the indention of the school committee to vote on the 
question of her dismissal at a meeting to be held on 
December 6, 1919. The petitioner was informed that the reasons 
for dismissal, were conduct unbecoming a teacher and insub¬ 
ordination. Ho recommendation was made by the superintendent 
The chief question presented was whether the school 
committee of a town like Hopkinton which was a member of a 
superintendency union was bound by Statute 1914 which re¬ 
quired a superintendents recommendation in connection with 
dismissal. 
The Supreme Court said in ordering the petitioner re¬ 
instated: The provision is broad in its language. It 
apparently includes all teachers within the commonwealth. 
The advice of the superintendent, who may be presumed to 
possess more than ordinary skill and judgment touching the 
general competency and usefulness of teachers, may be quite 
as necessary in order to prevent injustice and to insure the 
highest possible efficiency of the public schools in the 
small towns as in the larger centers. 
"No recommendation by the superintendent of schools 
was made as to the proposed dismissal of the petitioner; 
hence the school committee acted beyond their power in attempt¬ 
ing to discharge the petitioner from service." 
The court also pointed out that the Thanksgiving re¬ 
cess was not a customary vacation period within the meaning 
of section 42. 
Freeman vs. Inhabitants of Bourne, 170 Mass. 289 (1897) — 
The joint committee of the superintendency union of Sand- 
wich. Bourne, and Mashpee, at a special meeting on August 2, 
1893, elected Delbert G. Donnocker to be superintendent to 
fill a vacancy caused by the resignation of the former 
superintendent. In September, 1893, In the Superior Court, 
County of Cumberland, and State of Maine, Donnocker was in¬ 
dicted for the crime of adultery. He was tried by jury, 
entered a plea of not guilty, and a verdict of guilty was 
returned. Exceptions filed by him were sustained by the 
Supreme Court of Maine and a new trial was granted. The 
case was tried again In Superior Court and resulted in the 
disagreement of the jury. The case was tried a third time 
and twenty-one days later was "nol pressed." 
On October 2, 1893, at a special meeting of the joint 
committee the office of superintendent was declared vs cant 
by a vote of nine in the affirmative; none in the negative. 
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TetAlt7lrC?Zlttel<0f th® defendant town protested the 
c^iVta^parH^s^e ^ “"J?*** 
for one week and on October*9, ^898 t£e^oint8^°U^d 
chose the plaintiff to be supirlnwSS? "?^r the te™"" 
of ten^months at a salary of fifteen hundred dollars per 
annum. The school committee of the defendant town protest- 
ed against such action. On October 28, 1893, a special 
ba?1tl?S^f thf, J°int COTnmlttee was held and on vote by 
9 were meetings of October 2 and October 
9 were ratified, the defendant town non-concurring and 
protesting. e 
T5ie d.ei’endant town retained Donnocker at their portion 
tetl±TiGd t0 recelve the services of the 
plaintiff, although his services were legally tendered 
On April 23, 1894, the annual meeting of the loint 
committee was held and the plaintiff was regularly elected 
superintendent of schools to take effect from June 15, 1894. 
Assenting to this election, the defendant, after June 15, 
duly paid its proportionate share of the salary to the 
plaintiff and received his services. The plaintiff received 
no compensation from the defendant town from November 7, 
1893 to June 15, 1894, and demanded payment for same, which 
he was always ready and willing to perform. 
The case, an action of contract, was submitted to the 
Superior Court, and after judgment for the plaintiff, to 
the Supreme Court, on appeal. The plaintiff*s right to re¬ 
cover was denied by the defendant on the grounds that if the 
power to dismiss a superintendent existed, it was not in the 
joint committee, but in the municipality; that there was no 
power to dismiss the superintendent; that the superintendent 
could be dismissed only for cause, and that no sufficient or 
legal cause of dismissal was disclosed. 
The Supreme Court in affirming judgment for the plain¬ 
tiff stated that the joint committee became the agents of 
each town; that in the selection and employment of sn officer 
of such character there was an implied condition which 
authorized dismissal, if circumstances arose which rendered 
him no longer able or fit to perform the duties; and that 
where a superintendent was under indictment for adultery, it 
was competent for the committee to declare that he had become 
unfit to continue in that position. 
Frye vs. School Committee of Leicester, 500 Mas3. 357 (1938) — 
This case was the result of a petition for a writ of mandamus 
in the Supreme Court, filed by Marjorie J. Frye, a former 
teacher in the public schools of Leicester to effect her re- 
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instatement to her former position. The issue depended 
on whether or not she had acquired the status of tenure 
She began work in September, 1933, and taught regularly* 
organized classes for three of the seven daily periods 
^***^**S tbat year. She was reelected for the years 1934— 
1935, 1935-1936, and 1936-1937. 
The school committee claimed that because her last 
election took place on May 6, 1936, before the final ex¬ 
piration of her third consecutive school year, she had 
not served "for three previous school years” as required 
by statute, and that because she was originally employed 
as a "part time" teacher from September, 1933, to March, 
1934, the time from September to March could not be in¬ 
cluded ss a part of the three consecutive school years. 
The Supreme Court pointed out, in ordering the peti¬ 
tioner reinstated to her former position, that the statute 
recognizes no separate classification of "part time" 
teachers, the sole test being "service for the three pre¬ 
vious consecutive school years", and that a teacher must 
be deemed on tenure at discretion when he has actually 
served three consecutive school years, and has been elected 
for further service, even though the election has taken 
place before the expiration of the last three consecutive 
school years. 
Craves vs. School Committee of Wellesley, 299 Mass. 60 
(1937) ~-- The petitioner, S. Monroe Graves, sought a writ 
ot mandamus to compel the school committee of Wellesley 
to reinstate him to his former position as Superintendent 
of Schools. He had been employed in that position since 
1914 and in 1935 was holding the position on tenure. In 
July, 1935, the committee asked the petitioner to resign 
but he refused. In October, 1935, the committee wrote the 
petitioner urging him to resign before the expiration of 
the current school year which would occur in June, 1936. 
In February, 1936, the committee at a meeting stated that 
they could no longer wait for his resignation, that candi¬ 
dates for his position had been interviewed, and that 
another had already been appointed to succeed him. 
Early in March, 1936, the petitioner was notified that 
it was the intention of the respondents to v^te at a meet¬ 
ing to be held on April 7, 1936, that his employment would 
be terminated on July 31, 1936. The petitioner, on March 12, 
1936, requested a statement of the charges. Under date of 
April 1, 1936, the chairman of the committee sent the 
petitioner a letter stating the charges, one of which was 
"the failure to create and maintain the school system as one 
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conslstent whole.” The petitioner answered 
stating that the reasons given were too general and re¬ 
quested specifications of details as to which his work had 
been unsatisfactory. This request was refused but the 
chairman of the school board stated that in order to assist 
« t0„better understand some of Its charges it 
might be added: The findings of the Survey Committee re- 
specting (a) the lack of proper sequential order of study in 
the schools . . . surely reflect conditions which have ex¬ 
isted in our schools with your sanction over a period of 
years. ...” 
Hearings were held by the committee on April 13 23 
26, 1936, 0n APril 27> 1936, the school board vAted 
that the petitioner be dismissed as of July 31, 1936. The 
committee called no witnesses and produced no evidence in 
support of the charges and they called no witnesses and pro¬ 
duced no evidence to substantiate the charges. The petition¬ 
er introduced much evidence in his behalf. 
In sustaining the petition, the Supreme Court stated 
that there W8s no compliance with section 42 in that no 
evidence had been disclosed on the record which warranted a 
dismissal of the petitioner, no one of the charges had been 
substantiated, and there had been no judicial Investigation. 
The Court stated further that nothing can be treated as 
evidence which is not introduced as such and that disbelief 
of testimony is not the equivalent of evidence in support 
of the charges produced by the school committee. 
Houghton vs. School Committee of Somerville, 506 Mass. 542 
11940) — Fernell B. Houghton, a former teacher in the 
public schools of the City of Somerville, petitioned the 
Supreme Court for reinstatement to her position. 
The petitioner was discharged with the reason given 
that it was the policy of the school committee that the best 
Interests of the school will be served by the elimination of 
married women teachers as evidenced and declared by a rule 
of the school committee. The rule provided that the marriage 
of a permanent teacher should "operate as an automatic re¬ 
signation”; that no married woman should thereafter be 
elected as a permanent teacher; and that ”No married woman 
now in the service shall hereafter be employed as a perma¬ 
nent teacher . . • except one who proves to the satisfaction 
of the school committee that she is living apart from her 
husband. ...” 
The petitioner argued that the rule of the committee 
was not the embodiment of an educational policy, and that 
the committee had gone beyond its true functions and had 
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set up an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination on pure¬ 
ly economic and not educational grounds against two differ¬ 
ent groups of married women. 
The court, in dismissing the petition, held that the 
rule was within the policy making power of the school com¬ 
mittee and was not unconstitutional on the ground of dis¬ 
crimination, as employment "at discretion" was always subject 
to the policy-making powers of the committee, to such rules 
as they might adopt in pursuance of these powers, and to the 
power of dismissal expressly set forth in the governing: 
statute itself. 
The court further ruled, in answer to allegations of 
the petitioner, that the school committee’s hearing was not 
illegal because held in the evening or because the petition¬ 
er’s case was not reached until 10:15 o’clock; also that the 
- petitioner was dismissed by a "two-thirds vote of the whole 
committee" as required by statute and that there was no re¬ 
quirement in the statute that the making of rules determin¬ 
ing questions of policy shall be by a two-thirds vote, even 
though the operation of such rules may almost inevitably 
result in some dismissals. 
Knowles vs. City of Boston, 78 (12 Gray) Mass. 559 (1859) — 
This case was an action of contract brought by CharlotteM. 
Knowles against the City of Boston to recover salary as a 
teacher in a public school in Boston for the quarter ending 
December 1, 1855. 
The plaintiff was for several years an assistant teacher 
in Smith School, having been elected annually by the school 
committee, and received her salary quarterly for all services 
rendered by her before the first of September, 1855. On 
that day she entered on a new year of service in the same 
school and continued in that service until September 14, 
1855, when the school was abolished by the committee, and the 
plaintiff notified that her services were no longer required. 
She was dismissed for no fault ^r direlection of duty on her 
part, but solely in the judgment of the school committee the 
public interest required that the school should be abolished. 
The plaintiff demanded payment of the sum sued for, 
after December 1, 1855, and before bringing action. The de¬ 
fendants offered to be defaulted for a proportional part of 
the salary to the time of the plaintiff's dismissal, and 
the parties submitted the case to the decision of the Superior 
Court who gave judgment for the plaintiff for the sum offered. 




In affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, the 
Supreme Court said: ’’The facts in the case show that the 
mode of selection of teachers by the city was to make 
choice of them annually, and that they usually continued 
in employment in pursuance of such election for the en¬ 
suing year. But such an employment, in the absence of 
express stipulation, must be deemed to have been entered 
into under the provisions of the statute, which gave the 
right to the school committee to terminate it at any time.’’ 
McDevitt vs. School Committee of Malden, 298 Mass. 215 
(1957) — John W. McDevitt petitioned the Supreme Court 
for a writ of mandamus to compel the school committee of 
Malden to reinstate him to the position of principal at the 
required salary. 
On December 17, 1935, while the petitioner was serv¬ 
ing on tenure as a teacher in the Malden school system, the 
school committee elected him ’’Principal of the Lincoln 
Junior High School and the Lincoln Elementary School” to 
begin work on January 10, 1936. He was voted a salary of 
$3000 for the junior high school and $300 for the elementary 
s chool• 
On January 6, 1936, after a city election had brought 
about a change in the personnel of the board, the new board 
voted that ’’the Superintendent be instructed not to recog¬ 
nize” the vote of December 17, ’’inasmuch as it does not con¬ 
form with section 59, chapter 71 of the General Laws of 
Massachusetts and that the position be declared vacant.” 
That section provides that superintendents of schools "shall 
recommend to the committee teachers, textbooks, and courses 
of study.” 
The court, in dismissing the petition, stated that the 
school committee had general charge of schools, that the 
general managerial powers of the school committee continued 
to exist after December 17, 1935, that those powers in¬ 
cluded the power to change by a majority vote the duties of 
teachers on tenure at discretion and to assign them new duties, 
or to continue them in their existing duties, or to return 
them to duties formerly performed, that a principal is merely 
a teacher who is entrusted with special duties of direct on 
and management, and that the purpose and result of the second 
vote were merely to continue the petitioner as a teacher in 
the performance of the same duties performed before December 
17, 1935, an act which was within the power of the school 
committee to carry out. 
The court stated further that the fact lty 
if the committee were mistaken in their belief that 
5ecember 17 vote was invalid because the superintendent had 
100 
not recommended the petitioner, that belief was not the 
dominating reason for the vote of January 6; and that the 
petitioner was not entitled to the increase in salary as 
it is not the intent of section 43 of chapter 71 to protect 
a ”salary” the right to which never became vested. 
Moran vs. School Committee of Littleton, 317 Mass. 591 
(1944) ~ John Geddes Moran, a teacher serving at the 
discretion of the school committee In Littleton, having 
been removed from his position as principal of the high 
school of that town after a public hearing upon charges 
preferred by the committee, appealed from an order of the 
Superior Court dismissing a petition for a writ of mandamus 
which he brought to secure his reinstatement. 
During the hearing before the committee, two of the 
three members who constituted the committee testified under 
oath as witnesses, and were examined by counsel for the 
petitioner. Each of them after testifying resumed his 
duties as a member of the committee. Nothing in the record 
indicated that the petitioner had objected to the procedure, 
but in the petition he contended that by becoming witnesses 
they were thereby disqualified to act further as members 
and that the decision in which they participated was void. 
On this point the Supreme Court said that the general 
rule is that a member of an administrative board who is 
biased or prejudiced against one on trial before the board 
is not required to withdraw from the hearing if no other 
board can hear and determine the matter, especially if his 
withdrawal would deprive the board of the number of members 
required to take a valid affirmative vote. 
The court also said that the fact that two of the three 
members testified under oath as witnesses and were cross- 
examined by counsel for the teacher, did not disqualify t e 
two from resuming their functions as members of the com- 
mittee and participating in its decision as the plain facts 
of justice required them to disclose the f®0*;® th®^ 
knew if they intended to consider them with the other testi¬ 
mony. "Even in the absence of such a statutoryjprovision, 
a decision made in a quasi-judicial proceeding by an admin- 
istrative board based on evidence known only to members of 
the board is a nullity.1’ 
Tn answering to the objection of the petitioner con- 
in answering J , affidavits at the hearing 
cerning the introduction of six al*^av;^* * vlts are not 
before the committee, the court said. statements 
competent evidence to Prove the truth of^the j^ements^ 
law^unlesa“they"come°withln some established exception to the 
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hearsay rule. Members of a public board are frequently un- 
skilled in lav/ and rules governing admissability of evi- 
dence in courts cannot be expected to be rigidly enforced 
in hearings before such boards. We think that the better 
rUl^4.iS issues of fact affecting substantiated rights 
ought not to be decided on affidavits, especially if the 
method of proof can be avoided. 
"We think that one has no just ground for complaint 
because an administrative board in conducting a hearing of 
charges against him has permitted the introduction of hear¬ 
say evidence when he has failed to shnw that the other evi¬ 
dence was not adequate to support the conclusion reached by 
the board. The burden was on him to prove that the decision 
resulted in a substantial injustice to him. That does not 
appear on this record. 
"The order that judgment be entered dismissing the 
petition must be affirmed." 
Paquette vs. City of Fall River, 278 Mass. 172 (1952) — 
This case, found for the defendants in each case, was con¬ 
solidated in the Superior Court from the cases of Lillian J. 
Paquette vs. City of Fall River, and Alvin A. Gaffney vs. 
same. 
The plaintiffs, teachers in the public schools of Fall 
River brought actions of contract against said city to re¬ 
cover sums of money equivalent to 8 reduction in salary they 
received by a vote of the school committee "to reduce 
salaries of all teachers by an amount equal to twenty per¬ 
cent, effective April 1, 1931, excepting those who have not 
been employed for more than three years and who have not been 
elected to serve at the pleasure of the committee.” The 
plaintiffs were serving at the discretion of the school com¬ 
mittee. 
The Supreme Court stated that the word "grade” in 
section 43 is designed to include all public school teachers 
employed in a particular municipality, regardless of the 
name of the school in which the service may be rendered. 
"The word * grade1 is broad enough also to comprise tenure 
of office." 
"Clearly, identity of salary is not the sole test in 
determining 1 same salary grade'. It is only ^ne factor in 
determining whether specified teachers are 'of the same 
salary grade*• In deciding whether a general salary re¬ 
vision affeGts all teachers 'of same salary grade1, consid¬ 
eration must be given not only to salary received, but also 
to the sum of the factors comprehended within the scope of 
'grade'. Two teachers, one having a contract for one year 
only and the other having a continuous and indeterminate 
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service, cannot rightly be said to be in the same salary 
grade even though receiving identical sums as salary.” 
vs. Mayor of Fall River, 253 Mass. 590 (1925) — 
Lester M.Pecknam filed a petition in the Supreme Court on 
April 22, 1925, for a writ of mandamus directing the mayor 
and commissioners of the reservoir commission of Pall River 
to reinstate the petitioner ”in his employment as ox driver 
in the reservoir department. ...” 
The petitioner was appointed to his position under 
civil service on April 27, 1923, and was employed until 
July 12, 1924, when he was suspended without notice and with¬ 
out a hearing although there was work to be done of which 
he was capable of doing and willing to do. 
A single justice ordered the petition dismissed. Ex¬ 
ception by the petitioner to this order brought the case 
to the full court. The court in reversing the order of the 
single justice and sustaining the exception brought out 
that the petitioner could be dismissed only in the manner 
pointed out in sections 43 and 45 of chapter 31 of the 
General Laws which entitles a petitioner to a hearing, and 
that if the petitioner had brought this petition immediately 
after his suspension, he would have been entitled to relief; 
consequently his delay from the date of his suspension to the 
date of petition does not bar relief nor constitute neglect. 
Perkin3 vs. School Committee of Quincy, 315 Mass* 47 (1943) — 
P. Gladys Perkins, teaching on tenure in the public schools 
of Quincy, was notified that she was to be dismissed. On 
November 26, 1940, a hearing was held before five of the 
seven members of the school committee, at which time evi¬ 
dence was presented by the city solicitor for the City of 
Quincy, and by counsel for the petitioner. After the close 
of the evidence, arguments of counsel were heard by the five 
members of the school committee present. 
On December 10, 1940, the entire committee consisting 
of seven members voted on her dismissal, the vote being six 
for dismissal and one member voting present. Two of the 
members who voted for dismissal were not present at the 
hearing on November 26, 1940, when evidence was taken and 
arguments of counsel made. They did not hear any of the 
testimony, or see any of the witnesses. They read the entire 
stenographic transcript of the evidence, and the arguments 
of counsel, before the meeting of December 10. 
* 
Miss Perkins petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ 
of mandamus commanding the respondent to restore her to the 
position of a teacher in the public schools of Quincy. The 
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case was transferred to the Superior Court where the judge 
found the facts as stated in the auditor1s report and re¬ 
ported it to the Supreme Court for determination. 
In ordering the petitioner returned to her position 
the court stated: "The fundamental question for decision 
is whether the dismissal of the petitioner was made in 
accordance with the statutory requirement that ’no teacher 
. . • shall be dismissed unless by a two-thirds vote of 
... the committeeT read in the light of other requirements 
of the statute, particularly the requirement for a hearing 
* before the school committee1 of the nature described In the 
statute. The judge ruled ’as a matter of law these two 
members /“Prout and BurginJ/ were not qualified to vote on 
the ... dismissal, and since their vote cannot be counted, 
there was not a two-thirds vote of the committee as re¬ 
quired by law.’ This ruling was right. A teacher has not 
had the hearing that the statute requires if a committee’s 
vote for dismissal is dependent upon the vote of a member 
who has not participated in the statutory hearing.” 
Sweeney vs. School Committee of Revere, 249 Mass. 525 
$1924) ~ Two petitions were filed in the Supreme Court, 
the first being for a writ of mandamus directing the respon¬ 
dents to reinstate the petitioner, LeRoy E. Sweeney, as 
principal of the junior high school of Revere and the second 
to reinstate William F. Pollard as assistant principal of 
the senior high school in Revere, both at their former 
salaries of #2762.50 and #2600 respectively. 
The facts In the case were that both petitioners had 
served on tenure in their positions for a number of years 
and that on May 22, 1923, the offices of principal of the 
junior high school and assistant principal of the senior 
high school in Revere were abolished through consolidation 
of the two schools on a vote by the school committee. 
Sweeney and Pollard were to be retained as teachers at #2500 
each. There was no evidence of the superintendent’s recom¬ 
mendation that the positions should be abolished, or that 
the petitioners should be dismissed from their respective 
positions; nor did it appear that any economic reasons, nor 
want of competency and efficiency of the petitioners 
actuated a majority of the committee by whom the vote appear¬ 
ed to have been passed without any notice by the committee 
to the petitioners of their intended vote. 
In the case of Pollard the court stated: "The record 
clearly showed that the votes of Murray and Reilly, two 
members of the committee, were actuated by feelings of poli¬ 
tical resentment and ill-will more or less openly expressed 
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and exhibited. The votes were not cast upon the merits 
of the question, whether the position held by Pollard 
should be abolished, in the Interest of public welfare, 
but were cast as a convenient means of displacing him 
because of his political views, which did not appear to 
have been improperly expressed. The full committee con¬ 
sisted of seven members with two voting negative to the 
change. If Murray*s and Reilly’s votes were discounted, 
the vote would fail of the necessary two-thirds for the 
change. We do not consider that we are required to allow 
such a board to nullify the plain and salutory provisions 
of section 42 by simply covering their unlawful acts with a 
virtuous name. The committee to whose attention section 42 
had been expressly called by one of the members could not 
do indirectly that which It could not do directly. Pollard 
could not be dismissed as assistant principal of the high 
school unless he received the customary thirty days notice, 
as it was found that under the consolidation the adminis¬ 
trative duties of the principal of the combined schools 
would be so Increased that the position of assistant prin¬ 
cipal at least would be as essential as It was before such 
reorganization.” 
In the case of Sweeney, the court .said: "The auditor’s 
report indicates that the petitioner had not been dismissed 
through personal hostility and that the abolishment of the 
principalship of the junior high school was not illegal. 
Consequently the votes of Murray and Reilly in Sweeney’s 
case could not be Impeached. The effect of this vote on the 
salary of Sweeney Is not within section 43 because he was 
the only person of his class.” 
The Supreme Court sustained Pollard’s petition, re¬ 
instating him to his former position with costs. In 
Sweeney’s case the petition was dismissed. 
Pulvino vs. Town of Yarmouth, 286 Mass. 21 (1954) -- In 
this case the plaintiff, Joseph Pulvino, brought action of 
contract against the towns of Yarmouth, Dennis, and Brewster 
to recover salary alleged to be due him under a contract 
of employment as supervisor of music in the schools. The 
action went before the Supreme Court upon Pulvino*s exception 
to an order from the Superior Court directing a verdict for 
the defendants. 
Pulvino was employed as Supervisor of Music In the 
towns of Yarmouth, Dennis, and Brewster, said towns being 
joined in a superintendency union. The plaintiff was noti¬ 
fied by letter under date of September 1, 1931, on a form 
of ^phe "School Committee of Yarmouth” that he was elected 
a regular teacher in the public schools of the three towns 
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for the term of one year at a salary of $1600 from 
September, 1931, to June, 1932, and assigned to the Music 
Supervisorship School. This letter was signed ”Superin- 
tendent of Schools for the Committee of Yarmouth.” The 
plaintiff began work and was paid every two weeks. 
At a joint meeting of the school committees of the 
three towns held December 9, 1931, the superintendent re¬ 
ported dissatisfaction with the plaintiff. The meeting 
voted unanimously that the superintendent be authorized to 
make a substitution. Within a few days the superintendent 
asked the plaintiff to resign. Later the three towns voted 
separately to authorize the superintendent to notify Mr. 
Pulvino that his services were discontinued as of December 31, 
1931, by action taken on December 9, 1931. Another teacher 
was elected. 
r 
The Supreme Court, in overruling the exceptions and 
sustaining the verdict of the Superior Court, said: "There 
was no contract made which was binding on the defendants, 
followed by an illegal breach, as there was no evidence that 
the plaintiff was elected by the joint committee. If we 
were to assume that he ever was elected a teacher, he would 
still be unable to show wrongful action in his discharge. 
It has long been the law that a school committee could dis¬ 
charge a teacher at any time.” 
Reed vs. School Committee of Deerfield, 176 Mas3. 475 (1900) — 
William A. Reed petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of 
mandamus to the school committee of the Town of Deerfield and 
to Chester M. Barton, commanding them not to interfere with 
the petitioner in the performance of his duties as superin¬ 
tendent of schools in the district composed of the towns of 
Deerfield, Hatfield, and Leverett. The case was heard before 
a single justice of the Supreme Court who reported it for 
the consideration of the full court. 
At a meeting of the joint committees on April 7, 1900, 
the convention organized and proceeded to the business of 
^electing a superintendent of schools. For the purpose of 
equalizing the vote, the group agreed unanimously that be¬ 
cause the Deerfield group consisted of nine members, seven 
of whom were present, and the other groups consisted of 
three members each that the vote of each member from Deerfield 
should count three-sevenths of a vote, giving the seven 
members from Deerfield three votes, the same as each of the 
other towns. 
, A formal ballot was taken and Chester M. Barton re¬ 
ceived four and five-sevenths votes, while Frank Kennedy 
received four and two-sevenths votes. The chairman de- 
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dared that there had been no election, and the meeting 
adjourned until April 21, 1900. Barton had been serving 
the union as superintendent for five consecutive years 
prior to 1900 and continued to serve to the time of the 
filing of the petition in this case. 
On April 21, 1900, at the adjourned meeting of the 
joint committee attended by three from Leverett, three 
from Hatfield, and eight from Deerfield, it was voted to 
rescind the vote at the previous meeting, seven voting in 
the affirmative, six in the negative. In voting again for 
a superintendent, it was agreed unanimously that each 
member from Leverett and Hatfield should have three votes, 
and each from Deerfield should have one vote. A formal 
ballot was then taken and the petitioner, William A. Heed, 
received twelve votes and Barton eleven votes. The chair¬ 
man declared the petitioner elected, and no objection was 
made thereto. Upon this ballot, thirteen votes were cast, 
seven members voting for Barton, of whom two were from 
Hatfield and five were from Deerfield, and six voting for 
the petitioner, of whom three were from Leverett and three 
from Deerfield, and one member cast a blank ballot. 
The petitioner was informed of his election as super¬ 
intendent, and he accepted the position. On April 26, 1900, 
he began his duties, but on May 7, 1900, he received a 
notice from the Deerfield committee that they should recog¬ 
nize Barton as superintendent. 
In sustaining the petition, the Supreme Court said: 
"At the first meeting, the respondent. Barton, was elected 
and should have been declared elected by the chairman; 
however, this was not done and the meeting was adjourned 
and at the adjourned meeting it was voted to rescind the 
vote of the previous meeting. We are of the opinion that 
it was within the power of the meeting to rescind its vote. 
Rinaldo vs. School Committee of Revere, 249 Mass. 167 
(19365" --' Clara Rinaldo filed a petition for a writ of 
mandamus in the Supreme Court to compel the school committee 
of the City of Revere to reinstate her to her former posi¬ 
tion as a teacher in the public schools of that city. The 
case was heard by a single justice of the Supreme Court 
who found material facts and reported the case for determina¬ 
tion to the full court. 
The petitioner, after serving as a teacher in the 
public schools of Revere for three consecutive school years, 
was reelected in 1930 and thereafter served at the dis¬ 
cretion of the school committee. In 1927 the school com¬ 
mittee adopted a rule that ”it shall be inserted in the 
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contract of every woman teacher that marriage of a teacher 
shall terminate her contract, even if on tenure.” In 
1929 the committee adopted a second rule that "marriage of 
a woman teacher . . . shall operate as an automatic resig¬ 
nation of said teacher, and this regulation shall apply 
to teachers on tenure." 
The petitioner was well aware of the committee’s 
policy in this respect, as her contracts contained express 
stipulations to the above mentioned rules, to which she 
had assented. In June, 1935, she married. In the follow¬ 
ing September the committee would not permit her to teach, 
and on November 12, 1935, after a hearing in accordance with 
section 42 of chapter 71 of the General Laws, the committee 
dismissed her, the "causes" stated as being her "violations" 
of the terms of her contract as a teacher and the rules here¬ 
inbefore mentioned. There was no evidence of bad faith on 
the part of the committee. 
The Supreme Court said in dismissing the petition: 
"The primary question to be decided is whether, if a school 
committee has adopted a policy forbidding the employment 
of married women teachers, the marriage of a woman teacher 
can be found to be ’good cause* for dismissal under General 
Law, chapter 71, section 42 which, in its present form as 
amended by Statute 1934, chapter 123, provides that a teacher 
employed at discretion ’shall not be dismissed, except for 
inefficiency, incapacity, . . .’ We think the answer must 
be in the affirmative. 
"If the cause is at least fairly debatable and is 
asserted honestly, and not on subterfuge, that is enough. 
Whether or not married women should teach in public schools 
is a matter about which there may be an honest difference 
of opinion. We need not elaborate the possible arguments. 
"The statutory power was in fact followed. Insistence 
upon remaining a teacher after marriage could be termed a 
violation of the second rule if not the first. The super¬ 
intendent did give the committee his recommendation as re¬ 
quired by the statute. It was in substance that the com¬ 
mittee take action to enforce its regulations." 
Sheldon vs. School Committee of Hopedale, 276 Mass. 250 
(1931) -- This case resulted from a petition to^ the Supreme 
Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the school committee 
of Hopedale to reinstate the petitioner, Elba Sherburne 
Sheldon, as a teacher in the public schools of the town. 
The petitioner, then unmarried, was elected a teacher 
in Hopedale on July 12, 1922. She went on tenure in 1925. 
On May 20, 1930, the school committee unanimously voted to 
Instruct the superintendent of schools to "eliminate from 
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our teaching force female married teachers.” This vote 
was taken without prior specific recommendation in regard 
thereto by the superintendent. At that time there were 
four married female teachers in the schools; one a part 
time music instructor. On May 26, 1930, the petitioner 
was informed by the superintendent of the vote of May 20, 
and was invited to resign. This she refused to do. Since 
May 20, two of the four female married teachers had re¬ 
signed, and the fourth, the music supervisor, was reelected 
to continue her work. 
On September 8, 1930, the superintendent recommended 
to the committee the dismissal of Mrs. Sheldon. On 
September 10, 1930, the committee decided to vote on the 
dismissal on October 14, 1930 and notified her of their 
intended action previous to thirty days prior to its in¬ 
tended action. She requested a hearing and a statement of 
reasons for dismissal. The reason given for dismissal was 
the belief of the committee that "the best interest of the 
schools would be served by eliminating married women from 
the teaching force.” A hearing was held on October 14, 1930, 
and the petitioner was dismissed by a vote of the committee 
on the same date, following the hearing. 
The case was heard by a single justice of the Supreme 
Court who found that the petitioner had married in 1928 
on the assurance that her position would not be affected. 
The music supervisor was continued in employment because it 
was difficult to secure a part time teacher and because the 
committee did not consider her a regular teacher. The 
committee acted throughout in good faith and in the belief 
that the rule was of benefit to the schools. He ordered 
the petition dismissed. The petitioner excepted and the 
case went before the full court for a decision. 
The full court, in sustaining the rule of the single 
justice and ordering the petition dismissed, said: ”A 
decision that wise administration of public schools calls 
for the elimination of women teachers if they are married 
is not so irrational that it is inconsistent in law with 
good faith in dealing with dismissal.” 
Toothaker vs. School Committee of Rockland, 256 Mass. 584 
(19261 — Oliver K. Toothaker petitioned the Supreme Court 
for a writ of mandamus to compel the school committee of the 
town of Rockland to reinstate him to his former position as 
superintendent of schools. 
The petitioner had been employed on tenure in his 
position, having been employed since September, 1921. One 
of the three members of the school committee, Mr. Easton, 
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was elected to his post In March, 1924* During that year 
he was the only member of the three not satisfied with 
the petitioner's incumbency. In March, 1925, another member 
Mr. Ford, was elected to the committee. He too was un¬ 
favorable to the petitioner. In fact the outstanding issue 
of the campaign for election in 1925 was the dismissal of 
the superintendent. 
On April 28, 1925, the secretary of the committee 
notified the petitioner by letter that "on June 17, 1925, 
a vote of the school committee will be taken on the question 
of your dismissal ..." The petitioner requested a hear¬ 
ing and reasons for the proposed vote. On the morning of 
June 17, 1925, Mr. Easton called the third member of the 
committee, Mrs. Hayden, who was favorable to the petitioner 
stating that the petitioner desired a hearing, and that a 
special meeting would be held that afternoon. She gave her 
consent to the hearing but did not attend the special meet¬ 
ing and had no knowledge that the question of grounds upon 
the proposed vote was to be taken. When she learned of the 
narration of grounds at the evening meeting, she "protested 
the whole proceeding." 
At the evening meeting the petitioner attended with 
witness. Also present were the three committee members, 
a stenographer, and counsel for Easton and Ford. At the 
meeting Easton and Ford stated that the grounds for their 
proposed action were: "1. Lack of harmony and cooperation 
between the committee and Superintendent which is detri¬ 
mental to the welfare of the schools. 2. It Is believed 
that we can obtain and maintain a higher standard ... 
with the assistance of some other Superintendent than your¬ 
self." 
The vote was delayed until June 25, 1925, because of 
graduation exercises at the high school. On that date the 
committee voted to dismiss Mr. Toothaker by a vote of two 
to one. 
The esse was referred to an auditor and later heard 
by a single justice of the Supreme Court who denied the 
petition. The petitioner took exceptions and the case went 
to the full court which upheld the decision of the single 
justice who stated: "The notice of intention to vote on 
removal was sufficient. The special meeting of June 17 
was legal as there was no evidence of fraudulent conceal¬ 
ment. There was no illegality in the attendance of counsel 
for the members of the school committee at tne session on 
June 25. ... 
"The vote to dismiss the petitioner was valid. Upon 
the evidence of the report to the auditor, I am unable to 
110 
conclude that the action of the members of the committee 
was dictated solely by personal ill will. The votes of 
the town had no binding or legal effect to control the 
action of members of the committee; but they could con¬ 
sider in deciding what was for the welfare of the schools 
the feeling of large numbers of the citizens towards the 
supe r1nte nde nt. 
"Dealing with the matter as one of discretion, I 
do not feel that one whose usefulness as a superintendent 
is so doubtful in view of the circumstances disclosed by 
the evidence, should be retained in office by this court; 
even though his ability and willingness to render good 
service to the schools of Rockland are as great as, from 
the evidence, I believe them to be, and although his dis¬ 
missal is so likely to be a cause of regret to the committee 
and town." 
Wood vs. Inhabitants of Medfleld, 125 Mass. 545 (1878) — 
In an action of contract against the town of Medfleld, 
Cornelius E. Wood attempted to recover $150 alleged due to 
him as unpaid salary as a teacher in the public schools 
of Medfleld. The case first went before the Superior Court 
without jury. 
The plaintiff1s contract for the year 1873-1874 was 
signed with the understanding that he teach for the year 
and was for $1200. The school committee voted to close the 
school on May 29, 1874, and discharged the plaintiff. They 
notified him that his services were no longer required but 
gave no reason for their action. 
•» 
Wood objected to the action of the committee on the 
ground that they had no right to deprive him of his salary, 
except for some incapacity, or misconduct or other breach 
of contract. The judge ruled otherwise and ordered judg¬ 
ment for the defendant. The plaintiff alleged exceptions 
and the case went to the Supreme Court. 
In overruling the exceptions, the Supreme Court stated 
that there was no authority in law by which a school com¬ 
mittee can bind a town to pay for the services of a teacher 
after he shall have been discharged by the school committee 
acting under its obligations of duty. 
Opinion of the Attorney General, Volume 5, Page 422 (1919) — 
In a letter to the Commissioner under date of December 3, 
1919, the Attorney General said: 
"You have requested an opinion on the following propo¬ 
sitions:- _ 
‘Can a joint school committee, acting in December of 
this year, elect a superintendent of schools for a three 
year term to begin July 1, 1920?’ 
Ill 
’Can said committee elect a superintendent of schools 
to serve temporarily; that is, from January 1, 1920, to 
July 1, 1920?’ 
"The law relating to this subject is incorporated in 
Revised Laws, chapter 42, section 44, as amended by Statute 
1911, chapter 384, section 1, and is as follows: 
’The joint committee shall annually, in April, meet 
at a day and place agreed upon by the chairman of the com¬ 
mittees of the several towns comprising the union and shall 
organize by the choice of a chairman and secretary. They 
shall employ a superintendent of schools, determine the rela¬ 
tive amount of service to be performed by him in each town, 
fix his salary, apportion the amount thereof to be paid by 
the several towns and certify it to each town treasurer. 
Such superintendent of schools shall be employed for a term 
of three years, , and his salary shall not be reduced during 
such term.* 
"This law relates to the selection of a superintendent 
of schools by the joint school committees of school unions, 
and is not specific on the points about which you inquire. 
”It is my opinion that a superintendent must be employ¬ 
ed for a three year term, regardless of when employment 
begins•" 
Opinion of the Attorney General (1938) Page 28 — The follow¬ 
ing opinion was in answer to a question concerning the status 
of teachers on tenure in the City of Pittsfield, resulting 
from a proposed revisior in the city charter: 
’’Said statute of 1932, chapter 280, section 37, provides 
in effect that teachers shall be appointed only for terms not 
in excess of one year. This provision is entirely inconsis¬ 
tent with the terms of General Law, chapter 71, relative to 
the election of teachers ’to serve at its /~the school com¬ 
mittee* s_7 discretion’, as the quoted words are used in 
chapter 71, sections 41 and 42. As used in said sections 41 
and 42 the phrases ’serve at discretion’, ’to serve at dis¬ 
cretion* and ’employed at discretion’ connote employment not 
for a period with a fixed and definite maximum length, but for 
an. indefinite period. Hence the provisions of said General 
Law, chapter 71, sections 41 and 42, with relation to the 
tenure of teachers who are chosen to serve at discretion, have 
no application to teachers who are appointed annually, as 
those functioning under the newly adopted charter of Pitts¬ 
field are to be. In other words, the terms of said section 
41 and at least the second sentence of section 42, are render¬ 
ed ineffective as to the teachers of Pittsfield by the 
passage and adoption of said Statute 1932, chapter 280, when 
it becomes fully effective as described in its section 46. 
’’Teachers have no vested interest in the tenure of 
their offices that the same may not be altered or destroyed 
by an act of the Legislature, so that teachers elected prior 
to the passage of said chapter 280 will be in no different 
case than others after the act becomes effective in this 
respect.” 
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